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Water pollution is not a new problem. It began with the
birth of civilization and continues today, for man and pollution go
hand in hand. Today, however, there are more men than ever and
therefore more pollution. No longer can pollution be allowed to go
unchecked. The oil and gas industry is unique in the areal extent
and the sheer volume of potential pollutants it produces. The
industry finds itself haunted by ghosts from its past in the form of
practices of other years that are no longer acceptable, However,
many of the ghosts stem from substandard rules and laws of the
past «- especially those dealing with plugging of abandoned wells.
While there are a number of theories of private liability
for the pollution of water, most states have adopted either negligence
or some form of strict liability as their basic theory with one or more
in

of the others as possible secondary theories. In recent years, however,
the actual results have been more nearly the same as the courts in
"negligence" states have become more and more willing to find negli-
gence in any pollution case.
Defenses the oil industry has attempted to use in pollution
cases include limitations, incurred risk, the right to consume water
gives the right to pollute, balancing of equities, and unclean hands.
Most courts, feeling the burden should be placed on the wrongdoers
to apportion the damage among themselves and not on the innocent
plaintiff, will allow joint and several liability even when the tort-
feasors did not act in concert.
Almost every session of Congress or state legislature
produces new restrictions on water pollution. In recent years most
of the industry has realized that it is in its best interest to get its
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OIL AND WATER
THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY AND WATER POLLUTION
INTRODUCTION
Water is life. Those who have inhabited the arid
regions of this earth have always known it is so. Water
nourishes civilizations. The great system of aqueducts
was a mark of Roman civilization and the Babylonian
empire could not survive the destruction of its water
courses. In America today we experience water short-
ages of which our fathers never dreamed. Our rapidly
increasing per capita consumption of water and our
burgeoning population admonish us that we must become
as proficient in the management and coxaservation of our
water as we have already become in its use.
Every second, four new babies are brought into this world.
Every nine seconds, one is born in the United States. That baby's
prospective use of earth's resources is extraordinarily high -- at
least thirty times that of a baby in India by conservative estimate.
More than 56 3000,000 gallons of water, for personal use as well as
for agriculture and industry, will be required to supply that new Ameri*
can's lifetime wants. In 1963 the United States used 355 billion
Knodell, Liability for Pollu tion of Surface and Underground
Waters, 12 ROCKY MT. MIN. LAW INST. 33 (1967). [Hereinafter
cited as Knodell],
2The World -- and How We Abuse It, 1 38 NATIONAL GEO-
GRAPHIC 782 and Special Map-and-painting supplement (Dec. 1970).

gallons of water a day. By 1980 the total dependable freshwater
supply will be approximately 5 15 billion gallons per day. The
most we can ever hope to have available as a. result of engineering
works is 600 billion gallons a day. However by 1930 our daily re-
quirements will be 600 to 700 or more billion gallons per day and by
the year 2,000, at least 1,000 billion gallons per day. We thus must
learn to use and reuse large quantities of our available water supply
3
if it is to meet our needs. We must get used to the idea that the
water we use to make our coffee has perked in someone else's pot
and it behooves us as individuals and industries to do what we can to
prevent pollution of fresh water.
The oil and gas industry has a tremendous problem in
preventing pollution from its activities, for in addition to the polluting
potential of oil itself, the industry produces an estimated 23,560,121
barrels of saltwater per day or 8,599,441,165 barrels per year.
Texas alone produces some seven million barrels of salt water daily
and Kansas produces sixteen barrels of oil field brine for each barrel
4
of oil. We will examine some of the legal aspects of this problem,
Butler, The Oil and Gas Industry and Water Conservation,
16th OIL h GAS INST. 301, 303 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Butler] ;
Knodell, 33.
4INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, WATER
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH OIL PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED
STATES 12 (1965); Enright, Oil-Field Pollution and What's Being
Done About It, The Oil and Gas Journal, June 24, 1963 at 76.

but such a study would be worthless unless we can place it in the proper




For years there have been groups such as the Sierra Club,
the Izaak Walton League, and Ducks Unlimited, dedicated to the pre-
servation of wilderness areas or game animals, but general public
concern about the environment is a new phenomenon. Some trace
5
this concern back to the book Silent Spring, feeling that :
Prior to 1962 there was comparatively little public
concern over the problem of pollution. This was the year
that Miss Rachel Carson penned her controversial book
Silent Spring.
The poets have said the face of Helen of Troy' 'launch'd
a thousand ships".
In eighteen months, the pen of Miss Carson helped
launch more than 3,000 articles, more than 100 legislative
bills, and more than a score of investigations of all kinds
of pollution. Since 1963 it has no longer been possible to
keep a scorecard because of the avalanche of articles, bills
and investigations.
Comments on this controversial book have ranged
from a quotation attributed to Mr. Justice William O.
Douglas praising the book as ''the most important chron-
icle of this century for the human race"; while, on the
other hand, "Time Magazine," for example, called Silent
Spring an "emotional and inaccurate outburst" that was /
likely to "do harm by alarming the nontechnical public".
5RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
Wallace, The Legal Consequences of Sa lt Water Pollution
From Oil and Gas Operations, INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COM-




But it seems more likely that the public has reached a point where it
does not like what it sees and smells and so it wants its air and water
cleaned up.
Pollution and man go hand in hand. The founding of cities,
the invention of the steam engine, the first automobile, the first factory,
the first war, all these and many inore originated and continued pollu-
tion of the environment one way or another. But today there are more
men than ever before and therefore more pollution. We can no longer
afford to allow pollution to go unchecked if we want to have air to breathe
and water to drink.
"We are astronauts ~« all of us. We ride a spaceship
called Earth on its endless journey around the sun. This
ship of ours is blessed with life-support systems so inge«
nious that they are self renewing, so massive that they can
supply the needs of billions.
But for centuries we have taken them for granted,
considering their capacity limitless. At last we have begun
to monitor the systems, and the findings are deeply disturb-
ing.
Scientists and government officials of the United States
and other countries agree that we are in trouble. Unless we
stop abusing our vital life-support systems, they will fail.
We must maintain them, or pay the penalty. The penalty is
death. 7
It is difficult to find a publication, regardless of its general
purpose, that has not in recent years, had at least one article on some
7 Young, Pollution, Threat to Man ' s Only Home, 138 NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC 738 (Dec. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Young],

aspect of pollution. "Pollution, Threat to Man's Only Home" , "Pollu-
q
tion : Growing Menace -- What U.S. Is Doing About It" , "Pollution '70:
Challenge, Crisis, Change" , "Our Dying Waters" , "Ecology: A
12
Sampling of Navy's Efforts and Accomplishments" , and "Oih*Field
13
Pollution and What's Being Done About It" , are but a few of the
thousands of titles.
Ohio's Cuyahoga River oozing into Lake Erie at Cleveland is
so covered with oil and debris that in July 1969 the river actually caught
14
fire and damaged bridges. But other rivers in their own way are
almost as bad. In Texas the Trinity is used as a commode to flush away
°Id_.
Pollution * Gr owing Menace -~ What U. S. Is Doing About It,
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 9, 1969 at 40.
l0
Scott, Pollution '70 : Challenge, Crisis, Change
,
PETRO-
LEUM ENGINEER, October 1970 at 39.
U Bird, Our Dying Waters, THE SATURDAY EVENING POST,
April 2 3, 1966, at 30.
12
Neil, Ecology : A Samplin g of Navy's Efforts and Accomplish'
ments, ALL HANDS, February 1971 at 25.
1 3
Enright, Oil^Field Pollution and What ' s Being Done About It,







waste. In the District of Columbia, the Potomac reeks of sewage
from Virginia, Maryland and the District. In New York the Hudson
River is so polluted that "if you fall in here you don't drown -- you
17
decay". and the Mississippi is "the colon of Mid-America". 18
15McConal, Pollution, The Trinity ... It's Like a Commod e,
Fort Worth Star-Telegram, July 13, 1969, § A, at 1, Col. 5.
Personal Observation and Young, 75 3.
17




III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WATER POLLUTION
A. Pollution Is Not New
19As has been pointed out, the history of the human race
could be written in mud. Some 8,000 years ago Sumeria, the world's
first civilization, fought the first battle against silt -- still a major pol-
lutant -- and lost. To irrigate the fertile plains of Mesopotamia the
Sumerians built a canal system that is still a marvel to engineers.
Then came the problems of pollution. To meet a growing demand for
lumber the forests on the slopes of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers
were cut down. This allowed the rains to sweep large quantities of silt
from the denuded mountains into the irrigation ditches. There followed
a search for slaves to keep the water courses open but even armies of
slaves could not cope with the problem. The irrigation system broke
down, crops failed, people starved, and the civilization went downhill,
The Romans had similar experiences when they built a storm
sewer, the Cloaca Maxima, to drain the low-lying Forum, This big ditch
disposed of the city sewage and changed the surrounding Campagna swamp
into fertile farm land. Rome's many war s were, in part, prompted by a. need for
19W. WEST, CONSERVING OUR WATERS (19 ) (Published
by Committee on Public Affairs of the American Petroleum Inst.);
Butler, 304-305.

slaves to keep the Cloaca open and to prevent clogging with silt and
garbage. Slaves became increasingly difficult to find and the sewage
system gradually fell into ruin, allowing the farm lands to revert to
disease-breeding swamp which resulted in the ravages of malaria
and plagues. Some historians attribute the debilitation of the Roman
citizenry to this situation.
Pollution has continued to plague man ever since, As early
as 1661, a tract on air pollution was published in England: Fumigium :
or the Inconvenience of the Acr and Smoake of London Dissipated.
In the early nineteenth century Henry Clay, concerned with the silt
problem, observed: "He is the greatest patriot who stops the most
21
gullies." And in December 1897 an article titled "Pollution of the
Potomac River" appeared in The National Geographic Magazine.
B. Standards Change
The petroleum industry has contributed its fair share to the
pollution problem in its relatively short life, but standards have changed
and technology has improved and it would be unfair to condemn the
present industry for sins of another era.
In America's first oil rush in Pennsylvania (1859-1880), the




waste and pollution was incredible. In, 1861 for example the Empire well
came in with a stupendous 3,000 barrels a day, ten times bigger than the
biggest yet. The bewildered owners were swamped by this embarrassment
of riches, No coopers could keep up with the demand for barrels; they
couldn't shut off the oil; tanks and hastily built dams overflowed; and
22
children ran barefoot through the onrushing streams of oil.
In October of the same year the Phillips Well No. 2 roared
forth a staggering 4,000 barrels a day. It set up a record that wasn't
to be broken for twenty-three years. The well's owners devised the un-
usual method of selling "by the hour". Boats backed up to the troughs
that ran from the well to the bank of Oil Creek, to take on "an hour's
flow", or two or three or more. If the boat's vats .filled before the time
was up, the rest of the oil ~« say, nineteen minutes worth -- cascaded
23
into the creek.
During the Burkburnet (Texas) Oil Boom of 1918 oil was flowed
over the surface into earthen pits, then pumped into a battery of storage
tanks.
In many instances the fertility of the land was badly im-
paired because oil gushed out of control and tanks were drained
of basic sediment. In extreme cases, as much as 20 percent of
the area of a farm has been damaged from these causes. The
ground may look solid, yet when one steps on it he is swallowed
22H. DOLSON, THE GREAT OILDORADO 77 ( 1959) [herein-




to his knees. Even in town, where the wells were better
controlled than in the countryside, much of the soil was
injured. Grass would not grow on the petroleum-soaked
high-school campus until the dirt was dug up to a depth of
four feet, hauled away, and fresh earth brought in. The
oil boom left scars on the soil as well as on men's souls.
Much of the pollution which plagues older producing states
stems from substandard rules and laws of the past -- especially those
having to do with plugging of abandoned wells. In many cases, these
wells were "plugged 1 ' in accordance with the then existent state law.
But those old plugging rules look pretty silly today. In 1909, for instance,
Oklahoma required operators to plug wells by inserting a six-foot pine
pole in the well bore. An Oklahoma Corporation Commission official
says " we know now that such a plug would last perhaps 2 years,"
These old wells allow unrestricted flow of salt water from old producing
zones into shallower fresh-water sounds, and, since few, if any, records
were kept, these old holes are extremely hard to find. Then there is the
problem of who's responsible if they are found? In most cases those
who drilled them have died, moved away or simply vanished. There is
still a question of liability even if the driller could be found. If the well
had been plugged according to the old rules, can its driller be held re-
25
sponsible for pollution it caused later? And over and above these




problem wells caused by the inadequate rules of the past are those
wells that were never plugged. Wells such as one drilled in 1939 in
2£»
Scurry County, Texas and abandoned by covering the hole with a rock,
or the 1 Rowena well north of Rowena, Texas that spewed salt water
under high pressure for over 40 years and created a 150 acre salt
27
water bog. Some producing states, as we will discuss later, have
tried to deal with the problem of the abandoned wells by new legislation
clarifying liability and establishing procedures to insure that such wells
are plugged or replugged. In the meantime they continue as a ghost
from the petroleum industry's past come back to haunt it.
In the past the petroleum industry has been rather careless
in its handling of salt water, destroying the usefulness of land and
polluting streams and subsurface water. But the oil and gas industry
has made great strides in living up to the new standards that social
duty with respect to pollution now require. However society tends to
exercise a type of ex post facto judgment in that it tends to judge past
conduct by current taboos. The industry has learned, or is learning,
to live without the use of salt water pits, at one time as much a part





IV. WATER POLLUTION PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO
THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
The oil and gas industry is unique in the areal extent and
sheer volume of the potential pollutants it produces. The industry
can be divided into four groups -~ the producers who bring the oil
and gas to the surface of the earth, the transporters who move it
from where it is produced to where it is processed and then deliver
the many finished products, the refiners who process the oil and
gas into useful products, and the marketers who sell the products.
A. The Producers
The greatest single pollution problem facing the petroleum
industry is the disposal of salt water produced along with oil. Since
the solid content of brine is predominantly chloride or common salt,
the chloride content is commonly used as the concentration indices.
Brines vary widely from field to field and formation to formation. A
representative range is from a minimum of about 5,000 parts per million
to more than 180,000 ppm chloride. The average probably runs 40,000
to 45,000 ppm. Ocean salt water is only about 20,000 ppm. Fresh
water for drinking normally is only about 100 ppm or less. Water is
considered unfit for human consumption when chloride content exceeds

14
250-300 ppm. One barrel of oil field brine containing 100,000 ppm
chloride will raise the chloride content of 400 barrels ~- 17,000
gallons -- of fresh water above the maximum recommended for good
28
drinking water. The salt contained in the salt water produced daily
in Kansas would be capable of raising the salt contained in 26 billion
gallons of fresh water to a point where it would be unsatisfactory as
29drinking water.
Until recent years most salt water was collected and held in
open pits until it evaporated or seeped into the ground. But often the
seepage of salt water resulted in the pollution of underground fresh
water and the overflow, for some reason or another, of the pits, pol-
luted surface water and damaged land and crops. For this reason the
industry, either voluntarily or as a result of "no pit" orders has moved
increasingly to the use of disposal wells to re-inject the salt water into
the ground either as part of a secondary recovery pressure maintenance
project or solely to protect fresh water.
These salt water injection wells themselves constitute a
potential danger to underground fresh water supplies. The water is
injected under pressure and will seek to escape through any weak link
28 Enright, 77.
29INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION , WATER




in the system, Pollution may occur as a result of failure of the equip-
ment or cementing of the well itself or as a result of migration from
the zone of injection due to hydraulic pressure.
As pointed out earlier, there are many old abandoned wells
that were not plugged or were plugged in a way now considered in-
adequate. It has been estimated that in 1965 there were approximately
one hundred thousand abandoned wells leaking salt water in Texas alone.
An effective pollution control program will require that all abandoned
wells known to be leaking salt water be re-entered, reworked, and
adequately plugged. It will however be difficult to locate leaking wells
that do not show signs of leaking at the surface,
Operators using salt water disposal wells or engaged in
secondary recovery operations in areas where there are abandoned
wells or unplugged old holes or core holes must exercise extreme
caution since the risk of pollution by migration of injected salt water
is much higher in such areas. In view of the quantities of salt water
now being injected and the greater amount due in the future, it is
possible that the greatest pollution threat faced by the oil and gas
industry is now developing. Great care must be given to the design,
construction, and supervision of injection systems.
Offshore, where the danger of pollution was spotlighted by




are coining under increasingly strict regulations. Considering the
number of wells and the amount of oil and gas produced, the industry's
record in offshore production is outstanding. And in the main it has
been beneficial to marine life, its platforms serving as man made
reefs. However the industry must learn to live with the new regula-
tions and those to follow.
B. The Transporters
Although there is some movement in oil, gas, and their
products by other means such as barges and rail, tank cars, the
principal transporters are pipelines and ocean going tankers. The
first oil pipeline was a two-inch line that ran from Pithole, Pennsyl»
vania to Miller Farm, the nearest rail stop. Completed in October
of 1865, its steam pumps forced eighty-one barrels of oil an hour
31
through its six miles of pipe. Thousands of miles of line now girdle
the earth.
Much of the pipeline mileage in the United States is owned
by common carrier lines with the right to condemn, maintain and oper*
ate their pipeline over their right-of-way or easement. The operation
of a pipeline properly constructed is not a nuisance per se and the re-
covery of damages resulting from the construction or operation of a






pipeline is a question of negligence. The pipeline operator is under
a duty to use ordinary care to prevent its escape and damage to others.
32
The care required is commensurate with the oil s potential for harm.
In pipeline construction, increased emphasis is being
given to the design and installation of the pipelines. Pipe is
hydrostatically tested at the factory prior to shipment and is
field-tested after installation but prior to operation.Maximum
operating pressure of the pipe is set at a much lower figure
than the yield strength of the steel. All pipe placed in the
ground is coated and wrapped to prevent corrosion of the
bare steel. Cathodic protection is another vital part of the
pipeliner's operation to limit leaks caused by corrosion.
By the use of rectifiers, corrosion is prevented in potentially
corrosive locations by maintaining at a suitable level an elec-
trical potential between the pipe and the surrounding soil.
The rectifiers must be carefully maintained and checked at
specific intervals. A pipeline properly wrapped and coated
and with sufficient cathodic protection will remain in excel-
lent condition almost indefinitely.
Special design considerations are followed by the pipe-
liner at river crossings. Extra-thick pipe is used. Overbends
for approaches to crossings are installed far enough back from
the banks to limit exposure of the pipe caused by future
meanderings of the river. Block valves operated manually
have been installed on both sides of a river crossing. More
recently, check valves are being installed on the down-stream
side of many river crossings, which will shut off the oil flow
automatically when a break occurs and the pressure drops in
the line.
Pipeline maintenance is essential. Pipeline companies
.... are now improving the marking of the location of pipe-
lines. New signs and aerial markers are being installed at
32Scurlock Oil Co. v. Roberts, 370 S.W. 2d 755, 19 O k GR
385 (Tex. Civ, App. 1963, no writ history); Humble Pipe Line Company
v. Anderson, 339 S.W. 2d 259, 13 O & GR 635 (Tex. Civ. App. i960
error ref'd n. r. e.); East Texas Oil R. Co. v. Mabee Consolidated




road and railroad crossings, fence lines, and other loca-
tions. Old signs are being repainted. Most breaks in pipe-
lines are caused by bulldozers, graders, plows, ditch-dig-
gers, and other heavy equipment striking the buried pipe-
line. Proper marking of pipelines identifies to everyone the
locations of the lines, and the signs provide information
about whom to call in the event of an emergency.
Air and ground patrol of pipelines is scheduled in
accordance with the existence of potential problems. Most
persons are under the misconception that the only purpose
of air patrol is to find leaks; air patrol is primarily for
leak prevention. These preventive measures are designed
to check condition of line markers, check exposed pipe due
to washouts, observe conditions of water crossings, particu-
larly during high water, and observe highway or other con-
struction and farm plowing and leveling in the vicinity of
pipelines.
The first real overseas shipment of oil seems to have taken
place in 18 61 when a Philadelphia firm sent the chartered brig Elizabeth
34
Watts to England with a cargo of oil. Tankers began to be a major
item of ocean commerce about the turn of the century. After the dis-
covery of oil at Splindletop (Texas) in 1901 their use boomed as the
industry struggled to move the oil to the Northeastern United States
35
and abroad. But those early tankers were a far cry from the giant
super-tankers of today, The potential danger of a tanker as a pollutor
was driven home by the Torrey Canyon disaster, but some of the newer
Hampton, Environmenta l Control Problems and the Oil
Industry in the Rocky Mountain Region, 15 ROCKY MT. MIN. LAW







supertankers carry over three times as much oil as the Torrey Canyon
and even larger tankers may be built. However the major cause of oil
pollution of the ocean is not the disasters but routine flushing of tanks
and allowing waste oil to escape. Liability for tanker operations are
governed by admiralty law and statutes.
C, The Refiners
The oil industry has a special interest over and above the
interest we all have in a reliable source of water, for the oil industry is
one of the largest consumers of water in the United States. The volume
of water used by the oil industry, about 3.5 billion gallons per day, is
second in industrial use only to the manufacture of steel, and represents
about 20°/o of the total industrial consumption in the United States, It is
slightly less than 50°/o of that used for municipal needs. The refining
of one barrel of crude oil in the United States requires an average of
468 gallons of water and a typical (median) refinery has a daily capacity
of about 16,000 barrels of crude oil, and circulates approximately 22.
5
million gallons of water daily. There is, however, a wide variation bet-
ween maximum and minimum water requirements. For example, one
refinery with a once-through water system used 1,870 gallons of water
to refine a barrel of crude oil, whereas another that recirculated all
36
For a discussion of this general subject see: Sweeney,




cooling water required only seventy-three gallons per barrel.
This tremendous volume of water becomes polluted as it is
circulated through the refinery and the more times it is recirculated
the more polluted it becomes. Process leaks are the major source of
contamination. Oil of all sorts plus phenolic compounds, cyanides,
organic sulfides, mercaptans, other organic compounds and heavy
metals pollute the process waters. They may also contain chromate,
fluorides, nitrates, phosphates and sulfates. At one time these harm-
ful wastes were allowed to enter rivers and streams without any
thought, but not any more. In 1929 the American Petroleum Institute
Committee on Disposal of Refinery Wastes was formed. This com-
mittee began to study and develop methods for preventing water pollu-
tion. The committee has published, and keeps up to date, a six-volume
manual on the disposal of refinery wastes. It sponsors research and
publishes reports on the results. The refineries follow the committee's
recommendations and seek to improve on them. As a result, the efflu-
ent water from refineries, almost without exception meets or exceeds
the quality standards now in effect and we have showplace operations
where fish or oysters are raised in the effluent water.
37INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, WATER




All of this costs money and as a result waste treatment is
a major expense in the operation of a refinery. Where possible, chem-
ical processes are used to convert plant wastes to salable materials
but where such methods are not feasible, refiners are turning to
biological processes, incineration, and deep-well disposal.
D. The Marketers
The marketer is faced with two water pollution problems --
underground petroleum product leaks and the disposal of waste oil
from service stations. Leak detectors for product leaks are now on
the market and the American Petroleum Institute has a special task
force to consider this problem. But the principal problem is disposal
of waste oil from service stations. Dumped into municipal sewers, it
plays havoc with the processing system. It usually cannot economical-
ly be re-refined or reclaimed. Thus there exists a still unsolved prob-
39lem of what to do with waste oil.
Swing, Refining Wa ste Products Pose Pollution Problem .
THE OIL h GAS JOURNAL, December 9, 1968 at 77: Butler, 311-314.
39 Hampton, 660-661.

V. LIABILITY FOR POLLUTION
In this paper pollution of surface and subterranean water
shall be referred to as water pollution. Distinctions will be made
between the two only where legally significant. Concern about the
40
pollution of the sea has increased as the search for oil moved off-
shore and as it became necessary to transport oil froin the far corners
of the world to the industrialized nations of Europe and North America
and Japan. But the event that brought the problem forcefully to the
public mind occurred in March, 1967 when the tanker Torrey Canyon
broke up after grounding on Seven Stones Reef off the coast of Great
Britain. Thirty-five million gallons of crude oil spread along the
coasts of Cornwall and crossed to Normandy and Brittany 225 miles
away. The dangers of oil pollution -— the destruction of fish, shellfish,
sea birds, fishing gear and beach installations; the creation of fire
hazards in ports; the fouling of small boats; and, the loss of natural
beauty with resulting financial losses to resort owners and the dependent
tourist industry — were all well illustrated by this disaster, as was the
damage that can be caused by the use of chemical dispersants and
40





detergents in an attempt to correct the situation.
Then the blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel on 28 January,
1969 gave the oil industry a black eye from which it will long be recover-
ing. The adverse publicity of this event completely blotted out in most
of the general public's mind the years of offshore drilling with little or
no pollution.
Interesting though the subject may be, pollution of the sea is
beyond the scope of this paper. Tanker operations in particular are
governed by the law of admiralty and is worthy of a separate treat-
42
merit. This paper will restrict itself to water pollution as above
defined and will attempt to concentrate on the cases and statutes of
Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and California.
A. Theories of Liability for Water Pollution
There are a number of theories as a basis for private litiga-
tion in cases of pollution of water that have been applied by the courts
43
or suggested by writers. Some of these are :
41
DEGLER, OIL POLLUTION : PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
(1969).
42
See Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM
L. REV. 155 ( 1968) for one treatment of the problems.
43
Knodell, 35 ff.; Wallace, 27 ff.; Jones, Escape of Deleterious
Substances : Strict Liability vs. Liability Based Upon Fault, 1 ROCKY
MT. MIN. LAW INST. 163 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Jones] ; Allison

23
A. Strict liability based on Rylands v. Fletcher, the Restate-
ment Ultrahazardous Activity Doctrine or an absolute liability or neg-




E. "Taking" of property, and
F. Right of riparian owner or prior appropriator to water of
a streain in its natural state of quality.
Most states have adopted either negligence or some form of strict




The leading case exemplifying the strict liability theory is
45
the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher. In that case the defendants
(cont,) and Mann, The Trial of a Water Pollution Case, 13 BAYLOR L.
REV. 199 ( I961)[hereinafter cited as Allison and Mann]; Keeton and Jones,
Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industr y, 35 TEXAS L, REV. 1 (1956)
and 39 TEXAS L. REV. 25 3 (I961)[hereinafter cited as Keeton and Jones
part I or part II]; McCleskey and Phillips, Private Law Remedies for
Water Pollution, PROCEEDINGS, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS WATER LAW
CONFERENCE 88(l966)[hereinafter cited as McCleskey and Phillips] ;
R. MCGINNIS, Liability of Mineral Producers for Surface and Subsurface
Pollution, July 7, 1967 (Paper presented to Mineral Law Section, State
Bar of Texas.) [hereinafter cited as McGinnis],
44
In discussing public and private liability this paper will




built a reservoir to provide water for their mill. Unknown to them
there were earth filled mine shafts into old coal workings that com-
municated with plaintiff's coal mine. It was found that the defendants
personally were free from all blame, but that proper care a.nd skill was
not used by the engineers and contractors who had built the reservoir.
As a result, when the reservoir was filled with water, it burst into the
shafts, flowed through the old workings and flooded the plaintiff's
mine. The majority of the Court of Exchequer held that non-exercise
of sufficient care on the part of the people who constructed the reser-
voir did not, in the absence of any notice to the defendants of the under-
ground communication, affect the defendants with any liability, there
being in the absence of such notice no duty cast upon the defendants to
use any particular amount of care in the construction of a reservoir
upon their own land. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Exchequer
Chamber which held it was unnecessary to ascertain "whether the
defendants are not so far identified with the contractors whom they
employed as to be responsible for the consequences of their want of
45
Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 1 Exch 265 (1866), affd. L. R.
3 H. L 330 (1868) both found in [1861-73] All E.R. Rep. 1
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skill in making the reservoir in fact insufficient with reference to the
old shafts, of the existence of which they were aware, though they had
not ascertained where the shafts went to", for :
We think the true rule of law is that the person who,
for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is
prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself
by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's de-
fault, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of
vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort
exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would
be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, seems on
principle just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten
down by the escaped cattle of his neighbour ,or whose mine
is flooded by the water from his neighbour's reservoir, or
whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour's
privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes
and noisome vapours of his neighbour's alkali works, is
damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but
reasonable and just that the neighbour who has brought
something on his own property which was not naturally there,
harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own prop-
erty, but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on
his neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the damage
which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own
property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief
could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at
his peril keep it there, so that no mischief may accrue, or
answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. On
authority this, we think, is established to be the law, whether
the thing so brought be beasts or water, or filth or stenches.
Thus the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher and the English Common Law is
summed up by the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus (so use
your own property that you do not do injury to another).
Kansas follows Rylands v.Fletcher. It has a statute making it

26
unlawful "to permit salt water, oil or refuse from any
. „ . well, to
escape by overflow, seepage or otherwise from the vicinity" of the
ii 46
'
well. But the courts have held that a statute is not needed to make
oil companies liable for damages and that this has been the law ever
since Rylands. The statute only made it possible to compel the
companies to keep the salt water confined without waiting for any
person to be damaged.
California has applied sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
(or as incorporated into the Civil Code §35 14 : "One must so use his
own rights so as not to infringe upon the rights of another") to cases
where an operator allowed his well to blow out, covering adjoining
48
land with oil, sand, mud, and rocks, and where the defendant per-
49'
mitted his irrigation water to saturate his neighbor s land. In the
first case the court said:
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an
enterprise lawful and proper in itself, deliberately does
an act under known conditions and with knowledge that
injury may result to another, proceeds, and injury is done
to the other as the direct and proximate consequence of
46
55« 121 Kansas Statutes Annotated.
47
"Wendthaudt v. National Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 168
Kan, 619, 215 P. 2d 209 (1950).
48
Green v. General Petroleum Corp. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P.
952, 60 ALR 475 (1928).
49




the act, however carefully done, the one, who does the act
and causes the injury should in all fairness, be required
to compensate the other for the damage done.^O
In the other the court said that "the rule is general that, where one
brings a foreign substance on his land, he inust take care of it and not
51
permit it to injure his neighbor." Thus without expressly following
the case, California has adopted the rule of Rylands.
Louisiana courts have applied strict liability, often saying
"The right of plaintiff to recover for any injury to his property result-
ing from ... waste oil and saltwater escaping from defendant's wells
52
or tanks is not seriously questioned." However there was one case
where the plaintiff claimed the defendant was strictly and absolutely
liable under the doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas and the
defendant contending that liability can be predicated only on negligence.
The court refused to decide the issue and applying res ipsa loquitur
5 3decided for the plaintiff. But a more recent decision returns to sic
54
utere. Where despite the use of proper care and modern scientific
50
205 Cal. 328, 333-334, 270 P. 952,955, 60 ALR 475, 480.
51
86 Cal. 236, 24 P. 989.
52
Greer v. Pelican Natural Gas Co., 163 So. 431, 432 (La.
App. 1935); Eagen v. Tri-State Oil Co., 18 3 So. 124 (La. App. 1938).
53
Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So. 2d 27 3
(1944).
.54
Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So.
2d 845, 4 O & GR 1499 (1955)
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methods, explosives used in a geophysical survey caused damage to
residences, the court said:
In disposing of question of this character, we are
mindful of two important considerations : First, to give the
owner of property the largest liberty possible, in the use,
occupation and improvement of his own property, consistent
with the right to employ modern methods and machinery in
accomplishing the improvements desired; and second that
one may not use his own property to the injury of any legal
right of another. This maxim of the common law, "Sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas", is so well established
and so universally recognized that it needs neither argument
nor citation of authority in its support.
. . , We are unwilling
to follow any rule which rejects the doctrine of absolute
liability in cases of this nature and prefer to base our holding
on the doctrine that negligence or fault, in these instances is
not a requisite to liability, irrespective of the fact that the
activities resulting in damages are conducted with reasonable
care and in accordance with modern and accepted methods.
It follows that clearly the plaintiffs in this instance
do not bring an action in tort but one that springs from an
obligation imposed upon property ov/ners by the operation of
law thereby granting to other property owners the maximum
enjoyment in the liberty and use of their property. To hold
otherwise would grant the right to conduct operations of a
nature as is here involved, and upon its being shown that
such activities are conducted in full accord with accepted
modern methods, no liability may attach therefor in favor
of persons injured.
One Mississippi case said that the "gravamen of plaintiffs'




80 So. 2d 845, 848-849, 4 O & GR 1499,
1502-1504 (1955).
56
The Southland Company v. Aaron, 221 Miss. 5 9, 72 So. 2d
161, 49 ALR 2d 243, 3 O & GR 822 (1954).
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but the court actually decided the case on the right of a riparian pro-
prietor to have the water of the stream come to him in its natural
purity and on nuisance.
In a decision which is probably unique, the Oklahoma court
57
equated the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands with res ipsa loquitur.
Plaintiff's stock water was polluted by a leak in the defendant's pipe-
58
line. The Oklahoma statute prohibiting escape of oil wastes does not
59
apply to pipelines. The court seemed to agree with the defendant that
there would be no liability without negligence. Nevertheless, the court
said that since the defendant had exclusive control over the oil, the
circumstances of the accident were of such a character as to justify
a jury inferring that negligence of the defendant caused the accident.
The burden was on the defendant to prove an act of God, interposition
of a third party or unavoidable accident. (Unavoidable in the sense that
construction of the safeguard was proper and adequate in the first in-
stance and proper inspection failed to reveal defects arising from the
eroding elements of time and use.) The court thus used res ipsa loquitur
57
Gulf Pipe Line Co. of Oklahoma v. Aired, 18 2 Okla. 400,
77 P. 2d 1155, 1157 (1938); Knodell, p. 41.
58 52 O. S. § 296.
59
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57
Gulf Pipe Line Co. of Oklahoma v. Aired, 182 Okla. 400,
77 P. 2d 1155, 1157 (1938); Knodell, p. 41.
58 52 O. S. § 296.
59




to supply the negligence, while professing to reject Fletcher v. Rylands.
A variation of Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine which is perhaps
more general is found in the Restateme nt of the Law of Torts. In
setting out the ultrahazardous activity doctrine the Restatement says :
Section 519 * * * one who carries on an ultrahaz-
ardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or
chattels the actor should recognize is likely to be harmed
by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm
resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultra-
hazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent
the harm,,
Section 5 20. An activity is ultrahazardous if it (a)
necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person,
land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by
the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of
common usage.




g. Concurrence of risk of harm and unusual nature.
In order that an activity may be ultrahazardous it is neces-
sary that it satisfy the conditions stated in both Clauses (a)
and (b). An activity which normally can be safely carried
on, or an instrumentality which can ordinarily be safely
used if reasonable care is exercised, is not ultrahazardous
even though it is carried on to gratify some purely personal
idiosyncrasy of the actor. On the other hand, even those
activities or instrumentalities which cannot be made safe
by the utmost precaution and care may be carried on or
used without incurring absolute liability if the activity or
instrumentality is one which is commonly carried on or
used * * *
.
h. Function of court and jury. What facts are neces-
sary to make an activity ultrahazardous under the rule stated




At least two California cases cite the Restatement on the
law and hold it is compatible with the California application of sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas discussed previously.
The rule that the violation of a penal statute designed to pre-
vent accidents of the kind that occurred is negligence per se as a matter
61
of law is one that is followed in a majority of jurisdictions. In those
cases in which pollution clearly violates state statute, the courts have
62
imposed absolute liability without hesitation. An Oklahoma Statute
requires
52 O.S. § 296. Refuse from wells-Deposition
No inflammable product from any oil or gas well
shall be permitted to run into any tank, pool or stream
used for watering stock; and all waste of oil and refuse
from tanks or wells shall be drained into proper recept-
acles at a safe distance from the tanks, wells or build-
ings, and be immediately burned or transported from
the premises, and in no case shall it be permitted to flow
over the land. Salt water shall not be allowed to flow
over the surface of the land.
Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 {1948);
Beck v. Bel Air Properties, 134 Cal. App. 2d 8 34, 286 P. 2d 503
(1955).
61
Keeton and Jones Part I, 9.
Knodell, p. 42. Note: It has been contended that this is a
misapplication of the negligence per se idea. That the rule is appli-
cable, generally speaking, only to unexcused violations. And that if
strict liability is to be applied it should not be imposed under the
guise of a negligence fiction. See Keeton and Jones Part I, 9.
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It is well established that violation of this statute imposes absolute
63
liability since such violation constitutes negligence per se. The
courts have held that this statute was aimed at drillers and producers
64
of oil, not at transporters, pipeline companies, and refiners. It is
highly penal in nature and therefore should be strictly construed.
For this reason the courts have ruled that it does not apply to refineries
65 66
not operated in immediate conjunction with wells, tank farms, or
67
pipelines. The liability under the statute exists even for damage on
leased land:
We find nothing in the statute v/hich either express-
ly or by necessary implication fixes a different responsibility
upon the operator of an oil well, where the operator is the
owner of an oil and gas mining lease on the land where the
damage occurs. The statute prohibits, and negligence as a
matter of law is implied, in the absence of a showing of
willful acts on the part of plaintiff causing this damage.
6 3
Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jackson, 202 Okla. 687, 217 P. 2d
816, 19 ALR 2d 1015 (1950); Devonian Oil Co. v. Smith, 124 Okla. 71
254 P. 14 (1926); Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Aired, 182 Okla. 400, 77 P. 2d 1155
(1938); Texas Co. v. Belvin, 207 Okla. 549, 25 1 P. 2d 804, 2 O & GR 94
(1952); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Sheel, 256 P.2d 8 15, 2 O & GR 986
(Okla. 195 3).
64
Mid-Continent Pipeline Co, v. Crauthers, 267 P. 2d 568
(Okla. 1954).
65
Johnson Oil & Refining Co. v. Carnes, 174 Okla. 599, 5 1 P.
2d 811 (1935); Gulf Pipeline Co. v. Aired, 182 Okla. 400,77 P. 2d 1155
(1938).
66
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Wilson, 178 Okla. 335, 65 P.2d
173 (1935).
67




However, the statute does not apply to flowing over and across that
portion of the surface of the leased land reasonably necessary to the
69
development of the land for oil and gas purposes. But, where it was
shown that salt water came from both wells on the plaintiff's land and
wells on adjoining land also leased by the defendant, the burden shifted
to the defendant to show "either that the entire damage complained of
was a result of and necessarily incident to the operation of the lease
upon the plaintiff's lands, or else to distinguish the damage resulting
from the operation of the lease on plaintiff's land from that occasioned
by the waters coming for the adjoining lands, if it desired to do so for
70
the purpose of mitigating the resulting damages". The statute does
not prohibit the storage upon land, the fee of which is owned by the
7 1
operator, of waste oil and salt water. '
The courts have held that in an action to recover damages to
land due to pollution from underground sources, 52 O.S. 296, has no ap-
plication even though the pollutant comes to the surface after a distance
(1935).
(1936).
68 Texas Co. v. Mosshamer, 175 Okla. 202, 5 1 P. 2d 757, 759
69 Pure Oil Co. v. Chisholm, 18 1 Okla. 618, 75 P. 2d 464 (1936).
70Pure Oil Co. v. Chisholm, 181 Okla. 618, 75 P. 2d 464, 467 ,
71





and then spreads over the surface. Recovery for pollution of sub-
terranean waters or pollution from underground sources, must be upon
73
the basis of negligence or nuisance. The statute does apply to dis-
74
charge of salt water directly into a stream, and where there is injury
75
to a non-landowner. The defendant can not avail himself of the fact
an act of God served to disseminate the waste substances if the defend-
76
ant s conduct contributed in any degree thereto.
As mentioned above, Kansas has a statute making it unlawful
"to permit salt water, oil or refuse from any . . , well, to escape by
77
overflow, seepage or otherwise from the vicinity 11 of the well. How-
ever, reference to the cases discussed at that time will disclose that
the court relied more heavily on Rylands v. Fletcher than it did upon
72
Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 40 3 P. 2d 507,5 10,22 O & GR
794, 797-98 (Okla. 1965).
73
Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403 P.2d 507, 5 10, 22
O k GR 794, 798 (Okla. 1965); Ross v. Fink, 378 P,2d 1011, 18 O &
GR 489 (Okla. 1963); Cities Service Oil Company v. Merritt, 332 P. 2d
677, 684 (Okla. 1958).
74
Owen-Osage Oil & Gas Co. v. Long, 104 Okla. 242, 2 31 P.
296 (1924).
75
Devonian Oil Co. v. Smith, 124 Okla. 71, 254 P. 14 (1926).
76
Champlin Refining Company v. Rayburn, 32 3 P. 2d 967,
8 O & GR 1082 (Okla. 1958).
77
Kan. Stat, Ann.§ § 55-21 (1964).
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the statutes in making its decisions.
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that the lower riparian
estate is burdened with a servitude to receive the waters which flow
naturally from estates situated upstream. However, "the proprietor
above can do nothing whereby the natural servitude due by the estate
78
below may be rendered more burdensome.
'
In a decision based on
this statute the court held an oil producer liable for discharging oil
field wastes into a coulee and placed on him the burden of disposing of
79
the wastes in a manner to avoid injury to lower riparian estate.
2, Ne^licrence
Prior to 1936 the Texas law was uncertain with some Courts
of Civil Appeals cases indicating that negligence was the only basis of
o oliability and others pointing towards an absolute liability on the as-
81
sumption that the defendant had created or was maintaining a nuisance.
TO
La. Civ. Code Ann,, Art. 660,
79McFarlain v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 118 La. 5 37,
43 So. 155 (1907),
°Cosden Oil Co. v. Sides, 35 S.W. 2d 8.15 (Tex.Civ. App.1931,
Writ ref'd).
8
Texas Co. v. Earles, 164 S.W. 28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914 no
writ history );Teel v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 47 Tex. Civ. App. 15 3, 104 S.W.
420 (1907 no writ history); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. O'Mahoney, 60 S.W.




But with Turner v. Big Lake Oil Company the Supreme Court of
Texas put an end to this uncertainty. The jury found that although
saltwater escaped onto the plaintiff's land from ponds constructed
and used by the defendants in the operation of oil wells, killing vege-
tation and polluting livestock watering holes, there was no negligence.
The plaintiff could recover for damages only by alleging and proving
some specific act of negligence by the defendants, or by alleging and
proving that the water polluted was a water course, pollution of which
at that time was prohibited by statute. The court went on to examine
Rylands v. Fletcher in some detail and finally declared :
. . .
we decline to follow and apply in this case the rule




(a) the rule has been generally repudiated by this
court [Citations] ;
(b) the basis of the rule drawn from its application
in England in cases of fire, damage by livestock,
and injuries to an innocent bystander have been
repudiated by us;
(c) the conditions which obtain here are so different
from those of England that the rule should not be
applied here;
(d) and because the rule of negligence, instead of
absolute liability, while not obtaining universally
• . . is , » . in effect the common law , , , in Amer-
ica, which is the common law which we follow
rather than that declared by the English courts.
The Turner case has been much cussed, discussed, commended
82





and condemned. Still until 1961 there was no doubt that it was the
84 85
law in Texas. Then came Brown v. Lundell. The jury in that case
found that the defendant had negligently permitted salt water to escape
from his pit and failed to protect the fresh water strata underlying the
property and assessed damages. The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that
there was evidence to justify a finding of wanton conduct on the part of
the defendant. The Supreme Court ignored the Court of Civil Appeals
opinion and held that the case was one of negligence. However, the
acts of negligence are nowhere pointed out and the evidence does little
more than prove the mere occurrence of the injury. The court says
only that seepage of salt into fresh water stratum could have been
8
15 Tex. L. R 8 361; 16 Tex. L. R. 127; 19 Tex. L. R. 90;
20 Tex. L. R. 399, 40.1, 413, 422; 21 Tex. L. R. 81, 459; 24 Tex. L. R.
400; 25 Tex. L. R. 425, 521; 26 Tex. L. R. 681; 27 Tex. L. R. 4, 354,
355; 28 Tex, L, R. 757; 29 Tex. L. R, 68 1; 32 Tex. L. R. 114; 7 Baylor
L. R. 35; and Green, Hazardous Oil and Cas Operations: Tort Liability,
33 Tex. L. R. 574 (1955).
84
Haynes B. Ownby Drilling Co. v. McClure, 264 S.W.2d 204,
3 O & GR 1493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954, error ref'd, n.r.e.); Lynn v. Moog,
222 F.2d 703, 4 O & GR 10 37 (5th Cir. Tex. 1955); Wohlford v. American
Gas Production Company, 2 18 F.2d 2 1 3, 4 ) & GR 448 (5th Cir. Tex.
1955). Phillips Petroleum Company v. West, 284 S.W.Zd 196, 5 O & GR
621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955, writ ref'd, n.r.e.) ; Humble Pipe Line Com-
pany v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259, 13 O & GR 635 (Tex. Civ. App. i960
error ref'd, n.r.e.).
1961).
85 Brown v. Lundcll, 344 S.W.2d 863, 14 O h GR 611 (Tex.

38
prevented and thus constituted a negligent use of the premises. The
majority attempted to distinguish Turner v, Big Lake by saying: "The
question presented in that case was whether or not the operator was
to be held as an insurer or whether the cause of action was to be pre-
86
dicated on negligence." In Turner the jury finding was against the
plaintiff landowner. In Brown the finding was against the defendant
operator. The Court felt that this made a difference and that from the
Turner opinion it was not unreasonable to conclude that but for the un-
favorable findings of the jury, recovery would have been allowed. The
dissent felt that the majority was actually holding the defendant ab-
solutely liable and in effect overturning Turner without saying so.
To further confuse the matter, the Court, on the same day
o y
it decided Brown v. Lundell, decided General Crude Oil Co, v. Aiken.
The facts were much like Brown but there were specific findings that
the defendant was negligent in that it (1) had used too small a pit for
the disposal of the salt water, (2) had located it uphill from plaintiff's
fresh water spring, and (3) had failed to seal the pit to prevent leakage.
The defense relied primarily on the holding of Warren
86
344 S,W.2d 863,870, 14 O & GR 611, 620 (Tex. 1961),
7 General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W. 2d 668, 14 O h




Petroleum Corp. v. Martin that the only duty owed by the lessee to
his lessor was to refrain from intentional, willful, or wanton injury.
In rejecting this defense the court restricted Warren language to cases
involving domestic animals -~ "fence" or "cow" cases -- and held
squarely that mere negligence would support liability for damages to
land. The court felt the lessee has no duty to fence out the lessor's
cattle and if a cow is a trespasser, the owner is not entitled to recover
unless conduct is willful. General Crude Oil Co . v. Aiken dealt with
dominant and servient estates and the extent of reasonable user by the
dominant estate owners. The surface estate is servient to the mineral
estate but even that right is to be reasonably exercised with due re-
89
gard to the rights of surface owners.
But even before Brown and Aiken there was indication that
the courts would be more willing to find negligence in pollution cases
90
than in the past. In Pickens v, Harrison a landowner and his tenant
brought suit alleging that the defendant, in disposing of salt water by
Warren Petroleum Corp. v, Martin, 15 3 Tex. 475, 271
S.W. 2d 410, 3 O & GR 1565 (1954).
89
General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W. 2d 668,669 ,
14 O & GR 631, (Tex. 1961).
90
Pickens v. Harrison, 151 Tex. 562, 252 S.W. 2d 575,
1 O & GR 1813 (1952).
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storing it in pits, with pipes going deeper, negligently polluted the
plaintiffs' water supply. The court held that the record contained
evidence to support the jury's findings that the defendant polluted the
fresh water sands with his salt water, that such pollution reached
Harrison's well, and that it was a proximate cause of damages suf-
fered by the plaintiffs. There is no discussion of negligence in the
opinion. In the Court of Civil Appeals, in alleging the defendant's
appellant negligence, plaintiff declared :
1. Appellant was guilty of negligence in failing, in disposing
of salt water, to protect fresh water sands from pollution, in
violation of Rule 20 of the Railroad Commission.
2„ Appellant was guilty of negligence in emptying salt water
into pits dug down to and into a fresh water sand.
3, Appellant was guilty of negligence in leaving a large
quantity of salt water standing in an absorption pit dug down
to and into a fresh water sand.
4. Appellant was guilty of negligence in emptying salt water
into open drainage ditches flowing into Luvis Creek.
92
In Ellis Drilling Corporation v. McGuire the court found negligence
in the faihire to have adequate means and appliances to prevent salt
water from escaping into plaintiff's land, And in Geochemical Surveys
93
v. Dietz the court allowed to stand a jury finding that the defendant
91
1 O h GR 1818.
92
Ellis Drilling Corporation v. McGuire, 321 S.W.2d 91 1,
10 O & GR 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959, error ref'd n. r. e.).
93
Geochemical Surveys v. Dietz, 340 S.W.2d 114, 14 O &
GR 409 (Tex. Civ. App, i960, error ref'd n. r. e.).
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was negligent in emptying salt water into open earthen pits, in failing
to seal these pits and in failing to return the salt water to the forma-
tions from which produced.
94
Although much criticized, the case that likely points the
way of the future in Texas water pollution cases, is Gulf Oil Corpora-
95
tion v, Alexander. The case involved the pollution of underground
water by seepage from a salt water disposal pit on a neighboring oil
and gas lease. The pit was no longer in use at the time of the suit
but there seems to be little question that it was the source of the pollu-
tion. The jury found negligence. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed
this finding for lack of evidence, but nevertheless affirmed the trial
court's decision. The court predicates this strict liability upon Rail-
road Commission Rule 20, now rule 8 (a), which provides:
Fresh water, whether above or below the surface shall be
protected from pollution, whether in drilling
,
plugging or
disposing of salt water already produced.
The court held that:
It is apparent this rule specifically prohibits the pollution of
fresh water by the disposal of salt water without any refer-
ence to negligence. Since appellant admits, as established
by the undisputed record, that it polluted appellee's fresh
water strata, appellant is liable for such pollution by reason
94
6 O & OR 460; McGinnis, 7-9.
95
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Alexander, 291 S.W.Zd 792, 6 O k
GR 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956. Error ref'd, n.r.e.).
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of its violation of Rule 20 above set forth . . . There is no
proof of negligence in the cause other than might arise from
the undisputed proof that appellant in polluting appellee's
fresh water strata violated a duty placed on it by Rule 20.
Irrespective of any technical discussion of the principles
of negligence, it is ruled that the violation of Rule 20 by
appellant in polluting the fresh water supply of appellee's
irrigation well gave right to the cause of action on the part
of appellee for his damage suffered by reason of such viola-
tion.
97The court relied on Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co. ' as sup-
port for this proposition. In that case the violation of Rule 40, pro-
hibiting the use of vacuum pumps, was held by the Court of Civil Ap-
peals to constitute negligence per se.
It is our conclusion that there is no merit in the contention
that the alleged violation of Rule 40 of the Railroad Com-
mission could not be made the basis of plaintiff's asserted
right of recovery of actual damages . , .
The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to pass on this question on
appeal of Grayce.
98
It has been pointed out that Grayce and all of the other
cases predicating liability on the violation of a regulation have involved
99intentional, not negligent, violations oi Railroad Commission rules.
96
291 S.W.2d 792, 794.
97
Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co., 37 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931) aff'd 128 Tex. 550, 98 S.W.2d 78 1 (1936).
98
McGinnis, 8.
99 McCleskey and Phillips, p. 96 feel this is a moot point in
view of Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art. 6049c, § 13 which expressly creates a
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Alexander has also been attacked on the grounds that :
. .
.Rule 20 does not define a standard of conduct. It does
not even unconditionally prohibit polluting fresh water with
salt water. If it did, without defining any standard of con-
duct, it is believed that it would be void because unreason-
able. It requires that fresh water "shall be protected".
It is submitted, first, that this requirement is met when
due care is used and, next, that if a correct construction
of the Rule is that it attempts to impose strict liability,
it is unreasonable and hence, void.
101
However, in view of Article 6049c, Section 13, expressly creating a
private cause of action for damages caused by violation of rules of the
Railroad Commission; the General Water Pollution Control Statute
making it unlawful to pollute the waters of the state; TEXAS PENAL
CODE ANN. Art. 698c §§3, 4, the new, pervasive criminal prohibition
against water pollution; the public concern with pollution; and the trend
of the Texas cases, the chances of a defendant prevailing in a water
pollution case will be rather slim even if the courts continue to give
lip service to the requirement that a plaintiff must prove specific acts
of negligence on the defendant's part.
The Supreme Court of Texas declined to pass on the question
(cont.) private cause of action for damages caused by defendant's
violation of rules of the Railroad Commission.
10% O h GR 460-461.
101
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., Art. 6049c, § 13.
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of negligence per se, saying only in a per curiam opinion :
We have concluded that there is evidence to support
the jury findings of common law negligence and proximate
cause, and both applications are denied with the notation
"Refused. No reversible error." This order must not be
taken as indicating either approval or disapproval of the
views expressed by the Court of Civil Appeals as to the
legal effect of Rule 20 promulgated by the Railroad Com-
mission of Texas.
But the signs still point to the acceptance of Alexander as the law in
Texas.
103
There is one Texas case which should be kept in mind by
anyone planning a secondary recovery program utilizing a water flood.
The defendant was found guilty of negligence in failing to seal off
seismograph holes. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the verdict
for the plaintiff, holding that the evidence supported the findings. Al-
though the defendant did not make the shot holes, knowledge of their
existence raised a question of foreseeability of damage.
Illinois has followed the negligence theory. In Phoenix v. Graham
104
102
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Alexander, 295 S.W.2d 901, 6 O &
GR 12 33 (Tex. 195 6).
103
Curry v. Ingram, 397 S.W.2d 484, 23 O & GR 976 (Tex.Civ.
App. 1965 error ref'd, n.r.e.).
04
Phoenix v. Graham, 349 111. App. 326, HO N.E.2d 669,
2 O & GR 325 (195 3).
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the oil and gas lessor attempted to collect damages contending that his
lessee had created a nuisance. The court rejected this approach in a




are practically uniform that the operator is
not liable to his lessor for salt water damage unless it was
caused by negligence in the operations ... It seems to be
generally recognized, especially in the large oil producing
states, that salt water in oil wells is a natural evil difficult
to handle, and some damage to property may be unavoidable,
in spite of the exercise of reasonable care. The proprietor
of oil land free from salt water has a natural advantage, and
owns a better property than one whose land is subject to the
evil. The latter has a burden attached to his ownership,
and no logical reason can be given for the law to remove
that burden and give him a better property than he owns, by
casting the entire burden on the operator to dispose of the
salt at his peril. The burden on the operator is sufficient
if he is required to use the reasonable care of an ordinary
prudent operator
. . , we hold in the instant case that plaint-
iffs have the burden of proving defendants were negligent and
thereby caused the damage.
As was discussed earlier, the Oklahoma courts have held that
in an action to recover damages to land due to pollution from underground
sources, 5 2 O.S. 296, has no application even though the pollutant comes
106
to the surface after a distance and then spreads over the surface. Re-
covery for pollution of subterranean waters or pollution from underground
349 TIL App. 326,
,
110 N.E. 2d 669, 671-672, ? Q h GR
325, 327-328.
106
Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403 P,2d 507, 22 O &




sources, must be upon the basis of negligence or nuisance.
In view of the difficulty of proving actual negligence, it is not
surprising, that the question has frequently arisen whether or not a
108
plaintiff can obtain the benefit of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. This
Latin maxim conceals the very simple notion that negligence may some*
times be established, without proof of a specific act or failure to act by
showing a kind of accident that does not ordinarily occur without negli-
gence. The two basic requirements of the doctrine are (1) all instru-
mentalities that could likely have been a factor in producing the result
must have been under the control of the defendant, and (2) the accident
must be of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence. The crucial point is whether or not the accident is one
that does not ordinarily occur without negligence. Such is in reality
a question of fact, a question which cannot properly be resolved with
respect to a particular kind of accident except by the introduction of
expert testimony by the party with the burden of proof, unless informa-
tion of the causes of the particular kind of accident can be considered
107
Cities Service Oil Company v. Merritt, 332 P. 2d 677, 684
(Okla. 1958); Ross v. Fink, 378 P. 2d 1011, 18 O & GR 489 (Okla. 1963);
Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403 P. 2d 507, ---, 22 O & GR 794,
798 (Okla. 1965). An Oklahoma Negligence ca.se is Sunray Mid-Conti-
nent Oil Company v. Tisdale, 366 P. 2d 214, 15 O & GR 504, 506 (Okla.
1961).
108
Jones &c Keeton, part T, 15-19; McGinnis 5-6.
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common knowledge of which the court may take judicial notice. The
courts of the oil-producing states have divided on whether or not to
apply the doctrine where deleterious substances have been permitted
to escape. This division can be directly traced to a difference of opinion
on whether or not the accident is the kind that does not ordinarily occur
without negligence. Keeton and Jones feel the trial judge should deny
the plaintiff the benefit of the doctrine in the absence of expert testimony
unless the accident can be said to be the kind which an ordinary person
knows as much about as one in the business. If it is this sort of common
knowledge, and reasonable men could differ, the issue of negligence
109
should be subrhitted to the jury. Oklahoma and Louisiana courts
110
have applied the doctrine in a number of pollution and similar cases
but Texas courts have yet to apply the doctrine in a case involving the
escape of deleterious substances. However, it seems that the decided
cases were all instances where the plaintiff failed to make sufficient
1 11
proof to bring the rule into play.
109
Jones & Keeton, part I, 16-17.
110
Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 40 3 P,2d 507, 22 O &
GR 794 (Okla. 1965); Gulf Pipe Line Co. of Oklahoma v. Aired, 182 Okla.
400, 77 P. 2d 1155 (1938); Hoyt v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 69 So.2d
546, 3 O & GR 296 (195 3, La. App.); Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206
La. 942, 20 So. 2d 27 3 (1944).
Ill
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 15 3 Tex. 475, 271 S.W.
2d 410, 3 O h GR 1565 (1954); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155,




Nuisance, as applied to pollution cases, may be defined as
the creation of a condition which has the effect of interfering with the
112
use or enjoyment of the water. The courts have approved the use of
113
nuisance theory in cases involving violation of statute, activities
114
which inevitably cause harm, or negligent conduct of an activity
not inherently causing injury.
The true rule governing the distinction in cases
where a recovery is allowed regardless of any question of
negligence, and those where the right of recovery is de-
pendent upon the existence of negligence, is well stated in
Corpus Juris, vol, 46, p. 664, as follows : "A distinction
has been made between acts lawful in themselves done by
one upon his own premises which may result in injury to
another if not properly done or guarded, and those which
in the nature of things must so result; in the former case,
a person could only be made liable for actual negligence
in the performance of the act or mode of maintaining it,
while in the latter he would be liable for all consequences
of his acts, whether guilty of negligence or not. The one
can only become a nuisance by reason of the negligent
manner in which it is performed ,or. maintained, while
the other is a nuisance per se",
112McC.leskey and Phillips 91-92.
113
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d
211 (1936).
114
Cosden Oil Co. v, Sides, 35 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931, writ ref'd.).
115
Gulf, C.& S.F. Ry„ Co, v. Oakes, 94 Tex, 155, 58 S. W.
999, 52 L.R.A. 293 (1900).
.
116
Cosden Oil Co. v e Sides, 35 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. Civ.
App. 19 31, writ ref'd.).
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It is only unavoidable disturbances to which neighbors must
submit for the public good . . . "When it is established that
a person is creating a nuisance the mere fact that he is
doing what is reasonable from his point of view constitutes
no defense." . • . Where a party installs or operates machin-
ery and equipment with resulting injury to his neighbors'
property, and the detriment could have been avoided, com-
pensation for the damage incurred will be ordered*
. .
The courts have held that, "The discovery and production of
oil is a legitimate and lawful business, and, when properly carried on
1 1 8
and maintained, is not a nuisance per se". Neither is the operation
119
of a pipeline nor "the storage of quantities of inflammable products
or salt water from oil wells in proper receptacles generally and custom-
arily used by the industry upon land owned by the owner of the product
120
stored." On the other hand, the pollution of a public water course
121
is a nuisance, and therefore the pollution of a creek by the discharge
.12 2
of effluent by a refinery was a nuisance. The continued escape of
123
gas from storage and the pollution of a water well resulting froin
117
Eagen v. Tri-State Oil Co., 18 3 So. 124 (La. App. 19 38).
118
Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270
P. 952, 954 , 60 ALR 475, 480 (1928).
119
Humble Pipe Line Company v. Anderson, 339 S.W. 2d
259, 13 O & GR 6 35 (Tex. Civ. App. I960, error ref'd, n. r. e.).
120
'Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Wilson, 178 Okla. 335, 65 P. 2d
173 (1935).
121
Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W. 2d 5 34 (Tex. Civ.
App, 1942, writ ref'd). (Approved in Ex parte Genocov, 14 3 Tex. 476,




waterflood operations were found to be nuisances,
4. Trespass
125
Trespass is a theory often discussed by the writers but
little applied by the courts in pollution cases. While one court felt that
allowing oil to be carried down a creek and deposited on the plaintiff's
1 26
grassland was a trespass, another court felt a landowner could re-
cover for damage occasioned by salt water from a break in the wall of
a salt water pit only on the basis of negligence and not on the basis of
127
trespass.
Thus far the Texas courts have been hesitant to apply trespass
in pollution cases or to accept the idea of subsurface trespass. In
122
The Southland Company v. Aaron, 221 Miss. 59, 72 So, 2d
161, 49 ALR 2d 243, 3 O & GR 822 (1954).
123
Donahue v. Stockton Gas & E. Co., 6 Cal. App. 276, 96 P.
196 (1907).
124
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes, 371 P.2d 81, 16 O & GR 1016
(Okla. 1962).
125
Keeton and Jones II, 256 ff,; McCleskey and Phillips, 96
ff.; McGinnis, 2,
126
,Sussex Land & Live Stock Company v. Midwest Refining
Company, 294 F. 597, 34 ALR 249 (8th Cir. 1923).
127
"Moran Corp. v. Murray, 381 S.W. 2d 324 (Tex, Civ. App.






for example, the court summarily dismissed
the theory by stating without discussion that "We are of the further view
that the leaking of oil from appellant's pipeline and its percolation under-
ground to the land of appellees was, as a matter of law, insufficient to
constitute a trespass." An exception to the rule are the Delhi-Taylor
129
cases. In that series of cases the Supreme Court of Texas held that
the fissures created or the substances employed to "frac" an oil or gas
well were the type of "things" which could effect a trespass when the
defendant was acting intentionally, But the following year in Railroad
130
Commission v. Manziel ' the court held that in a secondary recovery
project, a trespass does not occur when the injected secondary recovery
fluids move across lease lines, and the operations are not subject to
being enjoined on that basis. There is no question but that the invasion
alleged in Manziel is direct, intentional and that the resulting harm
would be as substantial as in the earlier cases, One writer attempts to
reconcile the cases on the basis that in a fracing operation sand is injected
128
Humble Pipe Line Company v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 25 9,
1 3 O & GR 6 35 (Tex. Civ. App. i960, error ref'd n.r . e.).
129
Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 14 O &
GR 106 (Tex. 1961) and Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Holmes, 344 S.W.2d
420, 14 O & GR 103 (Tex. 1961).
130
Railroad Commission v. Manziel, 361 S.W. 2d 560, 17 O h
GR 444 (Tex. 1962).
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in the cracks and remains there to hold open the fissure resulting in
an occupation of the plaintiff's subsurface while water is fugacious and
131
may not remain lodged in plaintiff's subsurface. This reasoning
seems a little tenuous and about all that can reasonably be said is
that the availability of trespass as a remedy in Texas is still unclear.
A Texas court has held that «•« in a case of alleged directional drilling
132
that if the bit crosses property lines th^re is a trespass.
133
In Oklahoma, the Supreme Court has held that a land-
owner had no right either to prevent an adjoining landowner from injec-
tion of salt water into a disposal well, resulting in a migration of the
water underneath plaintiff's land, or to recover on a quantum m eruit
basis for the unauthorized use of his land. The court did state that oil
companies operating the injection well would be liable to the adjoining
landowner for any injury or damage occasioned to him, but no damage
134
was shown. In a later case the plaintiff was able to prove damage
131 McGinnis at 4.
132 Hasting Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 149 Tex. 416 , 2 34 S. W.
2d 389 (1950).
13 3 West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans,
204 Okla. 9, 226 P.2d 965 (1950).
134 West Edmond Hutton Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P.2d
7 30, 30&GR 1426 (Okla. 1954).
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and the court held the defendant liable. The plaintiff showed that he had
attempted to pull the casing on his wells but was prevented from doing
so by salt water which he was unable to cement off. He showed that
when salt water flowed from his well pressure dropped on the defend"
ant's injection well, that salt water coming out of his wells pulsated
simultaneously with the pump of the defendant's injection well, and
that after the injection well was no longer in use, pipe was pulled in
nearby wells without encountering salt water or difficulty in pulling the
pipe. The plaintiff's contention was that when the injected substance
crossed a boundary line into the land of one who has not consented
thereto, this is a trespass, and some of the language in the opinion
indicates that this is correct.
Although Keeton and Jones have concluded that :
... the orthodox rules and principles applied by the courts
as regards surface invasions of land may not be appropriate-
ly applied to subsurface invasions arising out of the produc-
tion of natural resources. They are possibly more nearly
akin to invasion of the airspace. Perhaps there should be no
liability for subsurface invasions of water, gas, or other sub-
stances produced or employed in the production of crude oil
and natural gas in the absence of proof of actual damage . . .
it may be that a nuisance approach to all such invasions, which
necessarily involves a balancing of interests, is the more
desirable one.
A plaintiff should seriously consider the application of the trespass
theory to his own case.
i35 Keeton & Jones II, 269-270.
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5. "Taking" of Property
It has been proposed that :
The deposit of waste, whether in the form of harmful
chemicals, salt water, or other refuse, in a landowner's
ground water reservoir, provides the actor with a recept-
acle for his waste. Regardless of the social utility of the
activity producing this waste and regardless of the care
with which such activity is conducted, the injured plaintiff
should be entitled to payment for such use of the estate in
his land. As a specific example, the oil producer may be
said to "store" his waste in underground reservoirs of
the adjoining land to which salt water has seeped and per-
colated by reason of inadequate storage facilities on the
subsurface. A strong allegation can be made to the effect
that this amounts to a taking of plaintiff's land for which
he should be compensated. -*"
Apparently this theory of "taking" has not been applied to
pollution of ground water but there are related cases which tend to
support it.
137
In Tidewater Oi l Co, v» Jackson
, Tidewater was engaged in
a secondary recovery operation authorized by the Kansas Corporation
Commission, The plaintiff was engaged in primary production on an
adjoining tract of land. Tidewater drilled its injection wells as close
to the plaintiff's boundary as possible^ knowing full well that the inevi-
table result would be to cause the invasion of the sand from which the
plaintiff was producing. It was acknowledged that since plaintiff was
136
McCleskey and Phillips, 99.
1 37
Tidewater Oil Company v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157, 18 O &
GR 982 (10 Cir. 1963), cert, denied 375 U. S. 942 (1963).
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engaged in primary rather than secondary recovery the water injected
would do the plaintiff more harm than good. Tidewater was trying to
block off any possible drainage, obtain the maximum possible production
from the area included in the secondary recovery operation and possibly
trying to punish the plaintiff for refusing to join in the secondary recovery
operation . The Tenth Circuit recognized that Tidewater operation was
lawful and in strict accordance with the orders of the Corporation Com-
mission but nevertheless imposed liability, holding :
Whatever rule Kansas may ultimately fashion to govern
the rights and liabilities of parties affected by underground
water flood operation in the interest of conservation, it
seems fair to assume that it will proceed upon the basis
and unes capable proposition that "no man's 1 ' property can
be taken directly or indirectly without compensation, Even
the sovereign must pay for what it takes or damages for
the public good. It cannot absolve a private party from the
1 ^8same duty.
The "taking" theory has been applied to pollution of surface
waters as long ago as 1906, In Bigham Bros, v. Port Arthur Canal h
139
Dock Co. the plaintiff sought damages when the bayou he used to
irrigate his rice crop was temporarily polluted through a canal, owned
by the defendant, which created a more direct connection between the
bayou and the Gulf of Mexico. The Supreme Court of Texas referenced
Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution which prohibits the taking
138
320 F. 2d 157, 163, 18 O & GR 982, 990.
139
Bigham Bros. v. Port Arthur Canal &: Dock Co., 100 Tex.
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of property without adequate compensation
,
and held that the right of a
riparian owner to take water from a stream was property and came
within this protection.
6. Right o f Riparian Owner or Prior Appropriator to
Water of a Stream in its Natural Stat e of Quality
Courts reluctant to impose absolute liability for pollution of
water on other grounds have been willing to enforce the absolute right
of a lower riparian owner or prior appropriator to receive water from
the stream without diminution in quality. In states which have
adopted the theory of riparian rights, it is well established that :
One of the cardinal rights of a riparian proprietor is to
have the water of the stream come to him in its natural
purity, or in the condition in which he has been in the
habit of using it for the purposes of his domestic use or
his business, and any wrongful pollution, defilement, or
corruption of the water, which prevents its use for any
of its reasonable or proper purposes, constitutes an ac-
tionable infringement of such right. It is the generally
accepted doctrine that a riparian owner sustaining sub-
stantial injuries by reason of such an invasion of his
rights may maintain an action without regard to the
motive which prompts the invasion, and the pollution of
a stream to the injury of a lower proprietor will not be
justified by the importance of the business or that of the
upper proprietor to either the public or the wrongdoer,




or by the fact that the latter is conducting such business
with care and in the only known practicable mode.
Louisiana courts reach a similar result based on the Civil Code. Arti-
cle 660 creates a "Servitude of Drain", in effect that a lower riparian
proprietor must accept drainage from a higher riparian proprietor.
But the courts have held that the servitude of drain due by the estate
below is corfined to the reception of water which runs naturally from
the estate above, and proprietor of the estate above is prohibited from
doing anything whereby this natural servitude may be rendered more
burdensome. It follows, the courts say, from the plain text of the art
that the proprietor of the estate above has no legal right to discharge
into a natural drain the waste oil and salt water proceeding from wells
sunk on his premises, and is responsible for the resulting damages to
the estate below. 4
In those states which have adopted the doctrine of appropria-
tion rather than that of riparian rights, the courts have uniformly held
that :
141 56 Am. Jur. 826-27, Waters Par. 405; Accord, Southland
Co., v, Aaron, 221 Miss, 59, 72 So. 2d 161, 49 ALR 2d 243, 3 O & GR
822 (1954); Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa. 267, 44 Am. St. Rep. 660, 30 A.
844 (1895); Bingham Bros. v. Port Arthur Canal & Dock Co,, 100 Tex.
192 , 97 S.W. 686 (1906); Benjamin v. Gulf, C.& S. F. Ry. Co., 49 Tex.
Civ. App. 47 3, 108 S.W. 408 (1908, writ ref'd); Teel v. Rio Bravo Oil
Co., 47 Tex. Civ. App. 15 3, 104 S. W. 420 (1907 no writ history).
142
McFarlain v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 118 La.
537, 43 So. 155, 156-157 (1907).
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... It is an established rule . . . that an appropriates
of waters of a stream, as against \ipper owners with
inferior rights of user, is entitled to have the water at
his point of diversion preserved in its natural state of
purity, and any use which corrupts the water so as to
essentially impair its usefulness for the purposes to
which he originally devoted it, is an invasion of his rights.
Any material deterioration of the quality of the stream by
. . . others without superior rights entitles him to both
injunctive and legal relief. . . . **3
B. Defenses
Returning to our primary interests of pollution of surface
and subterranean water, we ask what can an operator do when sued for
polluting ? What are his defenses ?
1. Limitations
One very common defense is the statute of limitations. The
problem in pollution cases is when do limitations start to run? One
Colorado opinion involving damage from seepage of an irrigation ditch
makes a point that also applies where pollution of subterranean waters
l43Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P. 2d 702, 709 (1942);
Accord, Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 2 30 U. S. 46, 57 L. cd. 1384,
33 S. Ct. 1004 (19 13); Sussex Land & Live Stock Company v. Midwest
Refining Company, 294 F. 597, 34 ALR 249 (8th Cir. 192 3); Levaroni
v. Miller, 34 Cal. 231, 91 Am. Dec. 692, 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 2 32 (1867);
Wixon v. The Bear River and Auburn Water and Mining Co., 24 Cal. 367,
85 Am. Dec. 69, 1 Mor. Min. Rep. 656 (1864); Logan v. Driscoll, 19 Cal.
623, 81 Am. Dec. 90, 6 Mor. Min. Rep. 172 (1862).

is concerned. The court stated a general rule that :
[A cause of action] accrues immediately upon the happening
of the wrongful act or the breach, even though the actual
damage resulting therefrom may not accrue until some time
afterwards. ... But in cases of waters escaping by percola-
tion and seepage from irrigation ditches, owing to the un-
certainty of its course and extent, the length of time required
after the construction and operation of such properties for
it to develop as to its uncertain course and slow state of
career under the ground depending upon the conditions of
the earch through which it must pass, the lay of the land,
and all other elements tending to make uncertain its future
location and extent, at least until it commences to show its
results at certain places, we do not think the rule . . . above
. . .
would make a practical, equitable, or fair test as to the
time when a cause of action for damages in this class of
cases should be held to accrue .... We think by adopting
the rule that the statute of limitations begins to run from the
date the lands were first visibly affected and injured by the
seepage which, and with its continuance from the same source,
caused the injury for which the suit is brought, is ... a rule
which will prove the most equitable, fair and just to all. . . .
By similar reasoning the courts have held that limitation does not begin
to run against a cause of action for subterranean pollution until injury
complained of becomes apparent, or should have been discovered by due
145diligence on the part of the party affected by it. Any other rule
144Middlekampt v. Bessmer Irrigating Ditch Co., 46 Colo.
102, 103 P. 280, 282-283 (1909); Accord, Beck v. American Rio Grande
Land & Irrigation Co., 39 S.W. 2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
145
Crawford v. Yeatts, 395 S.W. 2d 413, 24 O k GR 65
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965, error ref'd n.r.e.); Geochemical Survey v.
Dietz, 340 S.W. 2d 114, 14 O & GR 409 (Tex. Civ. App. i960, error
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would have the effect of barring the action in many, if not most, cases
before the discovery of the condition. The courts have said that if an
action, such as disposing of salt water in open pits, by the defendant
is lawful when done, the plaintiff may assume it is performed in a
non-negligent manner and will cause him no harm. To say that a cause
of action accrues prior to the time the damage becomes apparent to
the plaintiff in the exercise by him of due care and attention to his
146property would require him to be overly and unduly suspicious.
In the case of surface pollution the courts have applied the
general rules governing the running of the period of limitation. The
Supreme Court of Texas, for example, held that where waste water from
the defendant's gas transmission plant was continuously discharged
across plaintiff's property, the plaintiff's ''legal injury'' arose at the
time the discharge of water commenced. It made no difference that
the greater part of the damage did not occur until the two years next
(cont.) ref'd n.r.e.); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Alexander, 291 S. W. 2d 792,
6 O & GR 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 105 6, error ref'd n.r.e.); Harper- Turner
Oil Company v. Bridge, 311 P. 2d 947, 7 O h GR 10 17 (Okla. 1957);
Cities Service Gas Co. v. Eggers, 186 Okla. 466, 98 P. 2d 1114, 126
ALR 1278 (1940).
l46Geochemical Survey v. Dietz, 340 S. W. 2d 114, 117, 14
O&GR 409, 411-412 (Tex. Civ. App. I960, error ref'd n.r.e.).





If the plaintiff, or those in privity with him, consented to
the acts or omissions which caused his injury, he is barred by the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria or incurred risk . But
A plaintiff's right to recover cannot be defeated on
the theory that he assumed the risk of injury under the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria unless it appears that
with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the danger
involved he put himself in the way of the particular risk
148involved as the result of an intelligent choice.
The doctrine was applied in a case where the plaintiff was a tenant of
a landowner who sold a portion of the property for a carbon black plant
and was paid for any damages to the remainder of the property. Sub-
sequent to the sale, plaintiff leased the property and later sought dam-
ages to his cr ops from smoke and soot. The court held that the land-
owner knew what the defendant intended to construct and that it would
147 Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Fromme, 15 3 Tex.
352, 269 S. W. 2d 336 (1954).
148 Triangle Motors of Dallas v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354,
258 S.W.2d 60 (1958).
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produce smoke and soot, and "for a consideration has expressly con-
149
sented and encouraged its construction".
150On the other hand in Brown v. Lundell the defendant
failed to show consent to the actual injury and therefore the court re-
fused to apply the doctrine.
The operator says that, since the lessor consented to
the construction of the earthen pit, knowing that the salt
water and other waste would be deposited in it and accepted
payment for that use of the premises, she cannot recover
and the operator is not to be held guilty of negligence in
exercising the right that was granted. This argument, like
the disposal pit, will not hold water. What Brown failed to
allege and prove is that the lessor had reason to know or
to be aware that the salt water would probably percolate
downward and pollute the fresh water supply. If that had
been shown as a fact then equitable estoppel might be
employed against her claim for damages and the foregoing
rule [volenti non fit injuria] brought into play. We think
that the fact that Brown paid for the privilege of constructing
and using an earthen pit will avail him nothing. '-'1
152
In a California case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the dis-
charge of mining debris upstream on a creek. Almost a hundred years
earlier the predecessors of title of the parties had settled earlier litiga-
tion to enjoin pollution of the creek by a written agreement which granted
Crawford v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 62 S.W,2d 264
(Tex. Civ. App. 19 33, no writ history.).
l50Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 86 3, 14 O& GR 611 (Tex.
1961).
151
344 S.W.2d 863, 869 , 140& GR 611, 618-619.
l52Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P. 2d 702 (1942).
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the right to discharge gravel, dirt and mining debris from any of the
defendant's predecessor's mines, into the creek. The trial court held
the agreement a valid defense but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed
and held that the agreement created an easement for the benefit of the
mine properties owned and operated by the defendant's predecessor
at the time and to hold the easement extended to other properties operated
by the defendant would be to permit the burden of the easement to be in-
creased beyond the scope of the grant.
Thus while consent is a good defense, the defendant must be
able to prove the plaintiff, or some privity to him, has consented to the
exact event which caused the injury and the courts will take a narrow
view of what property was covered.
3. Right to Consume Gives Right to Pollute
1 c o
In Brown v. Lundel l D D it was contended that the right to
consume gives the right to pollute. The lessee contended that by virtue
of his dominant estate he had the right to use the subsurface water and
therefore he should not be liable for polluting it. The court did not
question the proposition that he had the right to use the water, "but the
right to use does not imply the right to damage negligently or unneces-
,154
sarily.




4. Need Only Refrain from Intentional, Willful or
Wanton Injury
Last but far from least of its effects: Brown along with
155
General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken laid to rest the contention, based
156primarily on Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin
,
that the only duty
owed by the lessee to his lessor was to refrain from intentional, will-
ful, or wanton injury. The court restricted the Warren language to
cases involving domestic animals «•«• "fence" or "cow" cases «•« and
held that while the surface estate is servient to the mineral estate that




5. Failure To Establish Causation
There must be a causal connection between the act of the
defendant and the injury received. Without this causal connection there




General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W. 2d 668. 14 O &
GR 409 (Tex. 1961).
156
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 15 3 Tex. 475, 271
S.W. 2d 410, 3 O & GR 1565 (1954).
l57General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W. 2d 668, 67 1,




acts. It is difficult to extract from the cases any broad rules as to
the quantum or quality of proof necessary to establish a causal connec-
159
tion but a typical example would be the case in which a Louisiana
court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff on testimony of a water in~
spector that his tests indicated a high salt content in the plaintiff's
irrigation water and that his search revealed no source emptying salt
water into the coulee from which the plaintiff irrigated except the de-
fendant's oil lease. While experts will normally be used to estab-
lish causation, the services of a professional chemist are not neces-
sary. In one case the plaintiff from time to time poured water from his
polluted well into several Pyrex dishes, permitted the water to evaporate
and tasted the whitish residue. The plaintiff's testimony that it was salt
was held to be proper proof even though he was not a chemist and could
158 Jackson v. Clark, 264 P.2d 727, 3 O & GR 198 (Okla. 195 3),
159
For a number of examples see Knodell, pages 63 through
70.
16
°Dubon v. Buckley, 161 So. 2d 301, 20 O & GR 330 (La.
App. 1964). Breaux v. Magnolia, 131 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 1961) gives
an example of a failure to establish causation.
161
Raschke, Smith & Wills, Let Engineering Know-How Solve
Salt-Pollution Problems, THE OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, August 9, 1965





not testify as an expert as to the chemical components of the residue.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently ruled that a cattle owner had
failed to establish a causal relationship between the escape of salt water
from neighboring oil operations and the salt water poisoning of his cattle.
Evidence of the condition existing after his injury was inadmissible to
prove that such a condition was the proximate cause of injury unless it
was shown there had been no change in conditions since the injury. The
failure barred his recovery of damages notwithstanding the Oklahoma
163
Statute that prohibits the release of salt water from oil operations.
6. Balancing Equities
In a case where the state sought injunction against the pollu-
ting of certain rivers or their tributaries, the defense raised the issue
of balancing equities. ° In answering this contention the court said:
... as to balancing equities. There simply are no equities
in behalf of anyone who is polluting public waters which are
used for domestic purposes.
Wallace, who was one of the defense counsel, had this to say concerning
162
Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Donahey, 205 Okla. 390, 2 38
P. 2d 308, 1 O & GR 100 (1951).
163
Lewis v. Berry & Company, P. 2d ,2 Environment
Reporter 1041 (Okla. 1970).
164
Magnolia Petroleum Co, v. State, 218 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.




In that case, three entire oil fields had been produced for
some 25 years with the salt water stored in pits and dumped
during flood time. The entire economy over parts of three
counties depended on these fields, and evidence showed
beyond question that had an injunction been granted on the
date of filing the suit, these fields would have been shut-in,
production irreparably lost; some 2,000 people would have
been without income; these counties would have lost a great
part of their taxable values; lending institutions would have
lost their security, and so forth. Incidentally, it was only
by some delay between the time of institution of the suit
and the time the injunction became permanent that injec-
tion wells were drilled and equipped.
As a practical matter, equities were balanced by
the law enforcement agencies for many years because most
of these officials in the oil producing states chose in favor
of oil when the choice was either oil or catfish. These
officials might not likely make the same choice or balance
these equities in the same way as of 1966. *°5
7. Unclean Hands
It is also unlikely that the courts would except unclean hands
as a defense. If pollution exists courts will most likely grant injunctions
even though the plaintiff is itself guilty of polluting. It is well estab-
lished that :
Pollution of a stream by others is no justification to
a defendant charged with fouling the water. The fact that a
water course is already polluted does not entitle other persons
to add thereto, or preclude persons through whose lands it






8. Othe r Defenses
Other defenses have been raised or suggested in pollution
cases including that the damage was a result of an act of God. But for
this defense to avail, the act of God must have been solely responsible
for the injury. If the defendant's conduct contributed in any degree
1 68
thereto, he is liable. One somewhat limited defense was the conten-
tion that the damages, or at least some part of them, was the result of
the plaintiff refusing the defendant's request for permission to enter
upon the plaintiff's land for the purpose of attempting to repair the
169damage. And finally a rather novel defense was made when a de-
fendant claimed he had become "a victim of the plaintiff's quest for
evidence which prompted him to turn the bleeder down to allow the
170
wanton flow of saltwater from defendant's separating tank." The
court refused to accept the contention and held the plaintiff's position
was well supported.
167
5 6 Am. Jur. 8 34, Waters par. 416, cites among other cases
Wendfohr v. Johnson's Estate, 57 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
168
Champlin Refining Company v. Rayburn, 32 3 P. 2d 967, 8
O h GR 1082 (Okla. 1958).
16QD7
Pfeiffer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 207 Okla. 48, 247 P.2d
520, 1 O & GR 1270 (1952).
170




In what may be a landmark decision, a California court re-
fused to accept as a defense the fact the defendant was in compliance
with water quality control requirements. The court held that a defend-
ant complying with the Water Quality Control Board of the state could
171
still be held criminally liable for violating the pollution law.
C. Joint and Sever al Liability
The courts have been far from unanimous in deciding how
the doctrine of joint liability should apply in water pollution cases,
Ordinarily several tortfeasors are not held jointly liable unless they
172
act in concert in the commission of a wrong. But it is not a prob-
lem only in states where absolute liability is not imposed for:
Once a tort is found to exist, then problems as to causation
and damage are the same as in states imposing liability,
One of the problems is whether independent tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable. If they are, it is usually pos-
sible for the injured party to make out a prima facie case
as to damages. On the other hand, if plaintiff must establish
how much of the damage is attributable to the activities of a
given tortfeasor, it will always, or at least almost always,
be impossible to make out such a prima facie case/' 3
In 1930 the Texas Commission of Appeal decided Sun Oil Co, v.









Robicheaux and held :
The rule is well established in this state, and sup-
ported by almost universal authority, that an action at law
for damages for tort cannot be maintained against several
defendants jointly, when each acted independently of the
others and there was no concert or unity of design between
them. In such a case the tort of each defendant is several
when committed, and it does not become joint because after-
wards its consequences, united with the consequences of
several other torts committed by other persons in producing
damages. Under such circumstances, each tort-feasor is
liable only for the part of the injury or damages caused by
his own wrong; that is, where a person contributes to an
injtiry along with others, he must respond in damages, but
if he acts independently, and not in concert of action with
other persons in causing such injury, he is liable only for
the damages which directly and proximately result from
his ov/n act, and the fact that it may be difficult to define
the damages caused by the wrongful act of each person
who independently contributed to the final result does not
affect the rule. ^5
But in 1952 the Supreme Court of Texas speaking through Associate
Justice Calvert overruled Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux. The opinion in
1 7 (Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. ° has to be one of
the most clear, concise and unequivocal ever written. The fact situation
was most unusual. The plaintiff had a lake stocked with fish. On the
1930.)
Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 2 3 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Com. App.
175 23 S.W.2d 713, 715 .
1 7 A
°Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 15 1 Tex.
25 1, 248 S,W. 2d 7 31, 1 O & GR 9 35 (1952).
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same day, the Disposal Company's pipeline broke and allowed salt
water to flow across land to the lake and a Sun Oil Co. pipeline broke
and emptied salt water into a spring branch which flowed into the
plaintiff's lake. The opinion declares:
The rule of the Robichcaux case, strictly followed,
has made it impossible for a plaintiff, though gravely in-
jured, to secure relief in the nature of damages through a
joint and several judgment by joining in one suit as defend-
ants all wrongdoers whose independent tortious acts have
joined in producing an injury to the plaintiff, which although
theoretically divisible, as a practical matter and realisti-
cally considered is in fact but a single indivisible injury.
As interpreted by the Courts of Civil Appeals the rule also
denies to a plaintiff the right to proceed to judgment and
satisfaction against the wrongdoers separately because in
such a suit he cannot discharge the burden of proving
with sufficient certainty, under pertinent rules of damages,
the portion of the injury attributable to each defendant . . .
our courts seem to have embraced the philosophy . . . that
it is better that the injured party lose all of his damages
than that any of several wrongdoers should pay more of
the damages than he individually and separately caused.
If such has been the law, from the standpoint of justice
it should not have been; if it is the law now, it will not be
hereafter. The case of Sun Oil Co, v, Robicheaux is over-
ruled. 177
The next important Texas case on joint and several liability was Burns
178
v. Lamb
, a Court of Civil Appeals case. The plaintiff had sued the
defendant for damage to land caused by pollution from salt water escaping
177
15 1 Tex. 25 1, , 248 S. W. 2d 731, 7 34 , 1 Q & GR
935,
Civ. App. 1958, error ref'd n. r. e.).
178 Bums v. Lamb, 312 S. W. 2d 7 30, 8 O & GR 1262 (Tex.
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from the defendant's lease. Evidence established that not only the de-
fendant's activities but those of other oil and gas operators caused the
damage. On appeal the defense argued that (1) there were no findings
that other operators' conduct was negligent or willful, (2) Landers ap-
plies only to conduct of joint tort-feasors, and (3) there being no joint
tortfeasors in the case, Landers was inapplicable. The Court rejected
this idea and thus extended Landers by holding a tort-feasor liable for
179
cumulative damage even though other damaging parties are not liable.
And finally a tort-feasor can maintain an action for contribution against
another tort-feasor who was not a party to the judgment even though the
judgment was an agreed judgment and not one judicially determined at
the conclusion of trial.
Louisiana courts have reached the same result as Landers
18 1based on the civil law doctrine of solidarity. This joint liability
has been applied to a case where at least some of the pollution in question
l79Sellers, 392; Note 8 O & GR 1267.
180 Callihan Interest, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964, error refd.).
18 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir,
La. 195 1); Williams v. Pelican Natural Gas Co. 187 La. 462, 175 So.
28 (1937); McFarlain v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 118 La. 5 37,
4 3 So. 155 (1907); Eagen v. Tri-State Oil Co., 18 3 So. 124 (La. App.
1938); Greer v. Pelican Natural Gas Co., 163 So. 431 (La. App. 1935);
White v. Edgerly Petroleum Company, 4 La. App. 20 (1925).

73
came from oil wells on the plaintiff's own land, operated by a company-
other than the defendant. The court stated the defendant could not
escape liability to the plaintiff. The defendant's status was that of a
joint tort-feasor and therefore solidarily bound for the damages re-
18 2
suiting from such relationship.
Oklahoma has long been squarely in the camp of joint and
183
several liability for all parties who contribute to pollution but in
184Walters v. Prairie Oil &t Gas Co. the court carved out an exception.
The defendants were able to show that the plaintiff's lessee producing
from the plaintiff's own land had also contributed to the pollution. The
court felt that it would be unfair to require the defendants not producing
from the plaintiff's land to pay the plaintiff for damage caused by opera-
tions on his own land, The court ruled that the landowner must bear the
burden of producing "evidence which will enable the court to separate
the amount of damage inflicted by the group of defendants sued from the
amount of damages resulting from the acts of the [lessee] , and to enter
i
185judgments against the defendants for the damages thus shown .
1 Q 7 Greer v. Pelican Natural Gas Co., 163 So. 431 (La. App.
19 35).
18 3
Harper-Turner Oil Company v. Bridge, 311 P. 2d 947,
7 O & GR 1017 (Okal. 1957).
l84
Walter v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 85 Okla. 77, 204 Pac.
906 (1922).
185 85 Okla. 77, , 204 Pac. 906, 908.
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In Cities Service Oil Co. v. Mcrritt the plaintiff did not
challenge Walters but sought to avoid its effect by simply waiving on
the record all claims for damage from pollution that was "privileged"
because it was necessary to the operation of the lease on the plaintiff's
land, and having the jury instructed not to consider the same. The
effectiveness of such an instruction is questionable but the approval of
this course by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma points the way for a
plaintiff to avoid the effects of Walters.
Oklahoma has held that a lessee and his drilling contractor
187
can be joint and severally liable for pollution as can a lessee and
loo
the pumper in charge of his lease. Although there seem to be no
other cases on these points, it would seem that the normal rules of joint
and several liability would require the same result in other jurisdictions,
Kansas holds the defendants jointly and severally liable in
189 190
pollution cases but Missis sippi courts seem disinclined to do so.
18
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677, 9 O & GR
1136 (Okla. 1958).
1 S 7
Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jackson, 202 Okla. 687, 217 P. 2d
816, 19 ALR 2d 1015 (1950).
100
Zarrow v. Hughes, 282 P. 2d 2 15, 4 O & GR 664 (Okla. 1955),
189
Polzin v. National Co-op Refinery Association, 175 Kan.
5 31, 266 P. 2d 293, 3 O & GR 776 (1954).
190
Southland Company v. Aaron, 221 Miss. 59, 72 So. 2d 161,
49 ALR 2d 243, 3 O & GR 822 (1954).
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In California the leading case, Slater v. Pacific American Oil Co., '
held there was no joint and several liability. Where land was injured by-
substances contributed by several companies, the defendants were
liable only for the portion of the damage which its contribution bore to
the whole of the substances. The court held that the plaintiff must
produce some evidence from which the defendants' proportionate lia-
bility may reasonably be deduced to collect for damages. However,
if the plaintiff can produce evidence which proves that the defendant
contributed to the pollution, then this would be grounds for injunctive
relief.
There is however some question as to whether Slater is
still the law. In later cases of joint and several liability the Califor-
nia Courts have been more favorable to the plaintiff. In Summers v.
Tice , ' a case involving a hunting accident where both defendants
fired in the plaintiff's direction, the court cited with approval the state-
ment by Dean Wigmore:
The real reason for the rule that each joint tortfeasor is
responsible for the whole damage is the practical unfair-
ness of denying the injured person redress simply because
be cannot prove how much damage each did, when it is
191
Slater v. Pacific American Oil Co,, 212 Cal. 648, 300
P. 31 (1931).
l92Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d (1948).
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certain that between them they did it all; let them be the
one to apportion it among themselves. Since, then, the
difficulty of proof is the reason, the rule should apply
whenever the harm has plural causes, and not merely
when they acted in conscious concert. * * * (Wigmore,
Select Cases on the Law of Torts, Sec. 15 3).
And the court went on to say of the defendants :
They are both wrongdoers ~- both negligent toward
plaintiff. They brought about a situation where the
negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff, hence
it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he
can. 193
194
In Griffith Company v. San Diego College for Women, 7
after discussing Slater , the court says :
But the Slater case in turn has been distinguished and dis-
regarded so often that Professor Prosser in Law of Proxi-
mate Cause in California, 38 California Law Review 369,
at page 388, says: "* * * The California courts and others
have said many times that the defendant cannot escape luibil-
ity because his own wrong has made it impossible to measure
the damages. Although this state has the only case the writer
has ever found in which the plaintiff was denied recovery for
lack of evidence, it is almost certainly out of line and can-
not be accepted as the present law. Beginning in 1940, the
intermediate courts have taken the bull by the horns and
adopted the suggestion of several writers, that where it is
clear that a defendant has been at fault and that he has
caused some part of the plaintiff's damages, the burden of
proof should rest on him to show the extent of his contribu-
tion, and that if he cannot sustain it he should be liable for
the entire loss." . . . [The court discussed support for this
conclusion.] . , , This seems to leave the California Rule
193
33 Cal. 2d 80, 86 , 199 p. 2d 1, 4 (1948).
194
Griffith Company v. San Diego College for Women, 280
P.2d 203 (Cal. App. 1955).
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in this shape : If defendant is shown with reasonable certain-
ty to have caused some damage to plaintiff by tort of breach
of contract, or if he is shown prima facie to be one of a
group of joint tort-feasors with whom a wrong originate,
the burden rests on the defendant to show that his act did
not contribute at all to the damage or that some other
cause for which the defendant was not responsible did
produce an identifiable and identified portion of it. "It
is well settled that one who contributes to a damage can-
not escape liability because his proportional contribution
to the result may not be accurately measured." Reclama-
tion Dist. No. 833 v. American F. Co., 209 Cal. 74, 80,
285 P. 688, 690. "Where parties contribute to damage
which has been caused by their acts and the acts of an-
other they cannot escape liability because their proportion-
ate contribution is not acctirately measured," Switzer v.
Yunt, 5 Cal. App. 2d 71, 41 F. 2d 274, 978. l95
Thus it seems likely that today a case like Slater v. Pacific American
would now go the other way.
D. Plaintiff's Relief
1. Damages
The courts of the oil producing states arc in substantial agree-
ment on the measure of damage when real estate is damaged permanent-
196ly by pollution. A typical statement of the rule is:
. . , the law is well settled that where injury to real estate
from salt water is permanent, the measure of datnages is
195
280 P„2d 203, 213-214 (Cal. App. 1955).
196
Jones, 216 ff.; Measure, Elements and Amount of Damages,
5 6 Am. Jur. 841, Waters part, 422; Pollution, 9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts
491; Measure and Elements of Damages for Pollution of a Stream, 49
ALR 2d 25 3 (1956). Knodell, 8 3.
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the difference between the value just prior and just after the
injury. . . also . . . plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for,
emergency expenditures . . «, made to minimize her damages.
But where the damage is temporary there is no hard, fast rule. How-
1 98
ever, the courts will usually follow the same general principles.
... Damages arising from temporary injury to land is
measured by different standards depending upon the vary-
ing circumstances of each particular case. It has been
held, for instance, that the reduced rental value of the
property after such injury is a proper measure . „ . The
cost of restoring such property into its prior condition
and the value of its use while in its injured state, has
also been held to be a proper measure of recovery . . .
,
The measure of damages is the value of grass as it then
stood, with interest, and not the difference in the value
of the land before and after the [injury] . • . • It is only
when injury to real property is permanent, that the dam-
ages therefor are measured by the depreciation in the
market value of the property. . . . ••""
In determining damage to growing rice crops, there should be considered
the average yield and market value of crops of same kind of rice planted
and cared for in the same manner in the same community. u ^ The
measure of damages to an oyster crop caused by oil pollution is the
197 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P. 2d 677, 687, 9 O
& GR 1136 (Okla. 1958). Accord: Phoenix v. Graham, 349 111, App.
326, 110 N.E.2d 669, 2 O & GR 325 (195 3);Wendtlandt v. National Co-Oper-
ative Refinery Ass'n, 168 Kan. 619, 215 P. 2d 209 (1950); Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Hughes, 37 1 P. 2d 8 1, 16 O & GR 1016 (Okla. 1962); Deep Rock Oil Corp.
v. Micco, 262 P,2d 45 1, 3 O & GR 187 (Okla. 195 3); Darby Petroleum Corp.
v. Mason, 176 Okla. 138, 54 P. 2d 1046 (1936); Moran Corp. v. Murray,
381 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.Civ.App. 1964, no writ history).
198
Jones 219 ff. and the cases cited therein.
199Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Day, 172 S.W.2d 35 6 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1943, error ref'd, want of merit).
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difference between normal yield and the amount plaintiff was able to
salvage times the normal sales price plus the actual expenses oE the
201
salvage operation. In general the damage to trees, timber and crops
202
are measured by the value of them at the time of the injury. For
temporary injury to land the reduced rental value seems to be the
203
standard most often used. It has been held that the proper measure
of damages for anticipated loss of crops which could not be planted be-
cause of spraying by oil and salt water was the reasonable rental value
204
of the land and not the anticipated profit. And a provision that lessee
"shall pay for damages caused by its operations to growing crops on
said land" does not include "natural products of the soil, such as native
205grasses used for grazing cattle."
Dubois v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 221 La. 161, 59 So. 2d
107 (1952); Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So. 2d 273
(1944).
Skansi v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 176 So. 2d 236, 23
O & GR 373 (La. App. 1965).
?' 02Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So. 2d 27 3 (1944);
Bean v. Tennessee Gas Transmission, 136 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 1962); Ghamp-
lin Refining Co. v. Rayburn, 323 P. 2d 967, 8 O & GR 1082 (Okla. 1958);
Windfohr v. Johnson's Estate, 57 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
203
Sussex Land & Live Stock Company v. Midwest Refining
Company, 294 F. 597, 34 ALR 249 (8th Cir. 1923); Zarrow v. Hughes,
282 P.2d 215, 4 O & GR 664 (Okla. 1955; Ingram v. City of Gridley, 100
Cal. App, 2d 8 15, 224 P. 2d 798 (1950); 39 Am. Jur. 395, et seq.
204Franklin Drilling Co, v. Jackson, 202 Okla. 687, 217 P. 2d
816, 19 ALR 2d 1015 (1950).
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In view of the differences in the measure of damages, the
courts must decide whether the damage is permanent or temporary.
If a nuisance or damage can be abated by the expenditure of labor or
money, it is not permanent.
The word "permanent" in a legal sense is not equivalent to
perpetual, or unending, or unchangeable. Permanency, in a
legal acceptation of the term does not mean forever -- in-
definitely long is sufficient.206
In awarding damages, courts have held that in determining
rental value it is proper to consider not only the land itself but also its
207
value in connection with the owner's other property and business;
that you do not balance conveniences or estimate the difference between
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff and the loss which may result to
208
the defendant from having his business declared a nuisance; that the
existence of additional water rights may only be urged in mitigation of
209damages and not as a complete bar; that values used are those at
205
Wohlford v. American Gas Production Company, 218 F.2d
213, 4 O & GR 448 (5th Cir. Tex. 1955).
? A
Danciger Oil and Ref. Co. v. Donahey, 205 Okla„ 390, 2 38
P. 2d 308, 1 O h GR 100 (1951).
207
Sussex Land & Live Stock Company v. Midwest Refining
Company, 294 F. 597, 34 ALR 249 (8th Cir. 1923).
208 Ingram v. City of Gridley, 100 Cal. App. 2d 815, 224 P. 2d
798, 801 (1950); 39 Am. Jur. 395, et seq.
209Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P.2d 702, 712 (1942).
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the time of the injury, thus evidence of the value of the land at the time
of the trial with and without such pollution is insufficient to support a
verdict; and that the plaintiff's refusal of the defendant's request
for permission to enter upon the plaintiff's land for the purpose of at-
tempting to repair the damage may be grounds for reducing or denying
211damages,
Punitive damages have been permitted under some circum-
212
stances. In general :
Where the evidence tends to establish grossly negli-
gent acts and omissions on the part of the oil lease operator
amounting to a wanton disregard of the rights of the owner
of the land damaged by pollution, the submission of the
question of punitive damages to the jury under appropriate
instructions is proper, and an award of punitive damages
in an amount greater than the compensatory damages
awarded is not unauthorized and will be sustained, unless
shown to have been awarded under the influence of passion
or prejudice. J
214
An example of the application of this rule is Jordan v. Peek where:
Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v. Ebenwein, 333 P. 2d
561, 9 O & GR 1150 (Okla. 1958).
211
Pfeiffer v. Stanoiind Oil & Gas Co., 207 Okla. 48, 247
P. 2d 520, lO&GR 1210 (1952).
2l2Jones, 226 ff.; Knodell, 89 ff.
2l3Syllabus by the Court, Jordan v. Peek, 268 P. 2d 242,
3 O & GR 332 (Okla. 1954).
2l4
Jordan v. Peek, 268 P.2d 242, 3 O & GR 332 (Okla. 1954).
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It was shown that hundreds of thousands of barrels of salt
water produced from defendant's wells were deposited in
a series of hillside pits and pools which were leaking fluid
approximately as fast as the salt water was placed into
them. This continued from the time the first well was
brought in, in January, 1949, until September, 1950, when
after a series of complaints had been lodged by the re-
presentatives of plaintiffs to defendant, a disposal well
was put into operation. This should have bettered the situa-
tion, but it appears that through disregard of the rights of
the plaintiffs and of gross negligence on the part of defend-
ant, the deleterious substances were not pumped from the
pits and ponds theretofore provided into the disposal well,
but, instead, a dike was either cut or a break-through
therein allowed to develop, and this waste continued to
flow upon the lands of the plaintiff. The defendant himself
testified that he did not exercise the same degree of care
in the operation of the lease as ordinary, because in this
instance he owned the land itself; that "where I don't own
the surface, I naturally keep the lease up." We think that
the evidence showed aggravating circumstances sufficient
to justify the submission to the jury of the question of
punitive damages. . . ^
2. Injunction
In appropriate circumstances injunction has always
been a proper remedy to abate water pollution. Since in-
junction is an equitable remedy, it is within the discretion
of the court to grant, subject to review and supervision by
the courts of appeal. The guide most frequently used by
equity courts in exercising discretion in awarding injunctive
relief in pollution cases is the doctrine of "balancing the
injuries". Under this doctrine, an injunction will not be
awarded to plaintiff if the injury defendant will suffer by
reason of granting the injunction is great and the injury
plaintiff will suffer if the injunction is not granted is
slight. 216
215
268 P. 2d 242, 246 , 3 O & GR 332, 337.
216Knodell 77. Also see 56 Am. Jur. 8 39, Waters § 421.
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Examples of the utilization of this doctrine are the cases Windfohr v.
217 218
Johnson's Estates and Wright v. Best. In Windfohr the court held
that the landowner was not entitled to injunction against operation of
oil well producing salt water, which occasionally overflowed the de-
fendant's reservoirs and reached the plaintiffs' land ''since (1) it
does not appear that the nuisance complained of was permanent and
not abatable; (2) the damages which will result to the defendants by an
injunction restraining further operation of the well would be so much
greater than any temporary injury to the plaintiffs," In Wright the
court refused to balance the injuries because an uncontaminated supply
of water was of more than a little benefit to the plaintiff and the record
did not show the defendant would be unable to operate his mine in the
face of the injunction. The court went on to state that the courts of
California were reluctant to balance the injuries where the tort is will-
ful, unless granting the injunction would produce great public mischief.
The court also held that it is no defense to a request for injunction that
others also polluted the stream.
But balancing the injuries is not the only guide used by the
2l7
Windfohr v. Johnson's Estate, 57 S.W.2d 215 {Tex. Civ.
App. 1932).




courts. In Sussex Land h Live Stock Co, v. Midwest Refining Company,
an injunction would not lie against the use of land for development of
oil, to prevent partial injury to land lying lower down a stream into
which some of the oil flowed, for the injury was temporary, although
extending over a considerable period of time, and could be compensated
220
by an award of damages. Estoppel may have also been a factor in
this case since the lower owner had accepted money payments for
221injuries during the course of development of the oil property.
It should be noted that while the principle set out in "Windfohr
and Sussex Land are still good, it is unlikely that a court today would
reach the same result in cases where salt water pits were allowed to
over-flow or oil allowed to flow in a stream. The present day applica~
tions will more likely be cases where the damages are very slight and
the pollution preventable only by extraordinary expenses. With the
present day concern for the environment injunctions against polluting
activities will be much easier to get.
^Sussex Land 8t Live Stock Company v. Midwest Refining
Company, 294 F. 597, 34 ALR 249 (8th Cir. 1923).
u 294 F.597, 605-607, 34 ALR 249, 259-260.
22
294 F. 597, 606-607, 34 ALR 249/260.

VI. REGULATION
Congress and the state legislatures have not closed their
eyes to the pollution problem and in recent years nearly every session
of Congress and many of the legislatures have produced statutes dealing
with air or water pollution. And administrative agencies have been
active in their rule making capacities.
A. State
Texas, for example, has had water pollution control statutes
222
of some type since I860, but most of those currently in force have
been enacted since i960. We will examine a few of the new statutes and
rules that are relevant to the oil and gas industry. The first of the new
223
statutes was Art. 762ld, the State Water Pollution Control Act of 1961.
This created the Water Pollution Control Board which was authorized
to issue permits to discharge wastes. It was the Board's duty to balance
the desire "to maintain purity of the waters of the State" with the desire
224
to encourage "the industrial development of the State" in issuing
222Acts 1360 at 97.
?23
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 76?ld.
224
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 7621D, Sec. 1
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permits. All water pollution control functions were not brought under
one roof and the State Department of Health, Parks and Wildlife Depart-
ment, General Land Office, Texas Water Development Board, Texas
Water Rights Commission, Texas Water Well Drillers Board, and the
Railroad Commission share the responsibility with the Water Pollution
Control Board. In dealing with the Railroad Commission, Art. 762 Id
originally provided only that the commission would continue to exercise
its authority to control the disposition of waste and the prevention of
pollution resulting from activities associated with oil and gas explora-
225
tion, development and production operations. This resulted in a
question as to whether the Railroad Commission or the Board or both
had jurisdiction of the disposal of oil and gas field wastes. The Attorney
General of Texas ruled that they held concurrent jurisdiction, but a
2 ? 6district court held that the Board had no jurisdiction in the matter.
At this point the 1965 legislature amended Art. 762 Id to state that the
Railroad Commission "shall be solely responsible for the control and
disposition of waste, and the abatement and prevention of pollution of
water, both surface and subsurface", resulting from activities associated
227
with oil and gas exploration, development and production operations.
-) o c
The Railroad Commission's authority is contained in Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 6029a.
"Hooper, Public Law Remedies for Water Pollution, PRO-
CEEDING UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS WATER LAV/ CONFERENCE (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Hooper].

The Commission also could issue permits for the discharge of such
wastes. Then in 1967 the legislature enacted the Texas Water Quality
Z28
Act of 1967 and the Water Pollution Control Board was replaced by
the Texas Water Quality Board.
This 1967 Act places emphasis on "quality control of the
waters' 1 as distinguished from "the abatement and prevention of pollu-
tion". The Railroad Commission's sole responsibility for the control
of oil and gas exploration, development and production operations is
continued but the Board has the exclusive authority for the establish-
ment of water criteria for all the waters of the state. Therefore for
the permits issued by the Commission to be valid, they must not result
in bringing the water quality in Texas waters below the criteria estab-
2?9lished by the Water Quality Board. " The permits issued by the Board
to pipeline operations, refineries, and other transporting or processing
activities or by the Commission to exploration, development, or produc-
tion activities, are subject to amendment, modification or revocation
and never become a vested right. Thus there is no legal assurance that
the holder of a permit will not have to modify or replace his discharge
227
Tcx. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ami, Art. 762 ld( I0)(c){4).
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 762 Id- 1.




treatment facilities long before they are worn out or fully depreciated.
The Railroad Commission's jurisdiction over the disposal
of oil and gas field wastes by subsurface injection is vested by the
231
Injection "Well Act, and over the activities of truckers in disposing
2 32
of oil field brine is established by the Salt "Water Hauler's Permit Act.
Under the Injection Well Act a person applying to the Railroad Com-
mission for a permit to dispose of oil and gas field wastes by injection
must submit a letter from the Texas Water Development Board stating
that the drilling and operation of the injection well will not endanger
233
any fresh water strata. The Permit Act prohibits hauling salt
water for hire without a permit. The main criteria for granting or
denying a permit are:
(1) Is the equipment such as will prevent leakage during
transportation?
(2) Does the hauler have permission to dispose of the salt
2 30For additional analysis of the Water Quality Act see
McGinnis p. 28 ff.
231
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 7621b.
232 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 6029b.








Another pollution control statute relevant to the oil and gas
2 35
industry is Art. 6005 as amended in 1965. It gives the Railroad
Commission authority to plug abandoned wells which were never prop-
erly plugged or which require replugging because pressure differentials,
cement failures or corrosion have caused leaks which developed later
and in spite of the fact that the well was originally properly plugged.
This law places the duty to plug a well on the operator, non-operators,
and landowner, in that order. If some one other than the operator plugs
the well he is given a cause of action against those with a "higher" duty
and if he pays more than his proportionate share of the cost, he is given
a cause of action against others in his class. If a well is not properly
plugged by any of these interested classes and if they cannot be found
or do not have the assets to plug the well, the Commission may plug the
well and the state is given a cause of action to recover the reasonable
cost against the operator, non-operator and landowner successively.
McGinnis p. 22~2 3 gives additional discussion of the Salt
Water Hauler's Permit Act,
235Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann, Art. 6005.
2 36McGinnis, 27 raises the point that :
If this act be construed to give the state a cause of action
to recover the cost of replugging a well which was originally
properly plugged before the statute was passed, it may possi-
bly be challenged on the ground that it is a retroactive law in
conflict with Article I, Section 16, of the Constitution.

.90
The statute authorizes the Commission to accept money from private
persons and use the money to plug or replug any well. Since the statute
provides :
Evidence that a person has paid inoney to the Commission is
not admissible against the person in any suit in which the
person's obligation to plug a well is an issue, and introducing
the evidence is a compulsory ground for mistrial.
A way is created for persons who were, or thought they might be, re-
sponsible for the improper plugging to fulfill their obligations without
the admission against interest in a damage suit that voluntary plugging
would be. Further, the Commission can authorize a third party to plug
a well without the third party assuming liability for any damage prior to
it plugging the well. Thus an operator planning a water flood operation
can get an authorization to go in and correct possible sources of trouble
2 38before he starts his water flood.
Under Art. 6005 at the end of 1969, 34 3 wells had been plugged
at a total cost of $425, 59 1. Of this total, industry contributed $127,745
and other agencies have helped the Commission finance plugging opera-
tions. For example, the Colorado River Muncipal Water District contri-
237 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 6005.
23




buted one-half of the money used to plug and abandon wells polluting
2 39
the Colorado River.
On the administrative front Texas has also been active. After
issuing numerous special field-wide, county-wide and multi-county
"no-pit" orders, on April 3, 1967, the Railroad Commission adopted
Statewide Rule 8C which prohibited the use of all salt water pits through-
out the entire state. There is no blanket exception for lined pits and the
backfilling and compacting of abandoned pits is required. The new rule
also prohibits disposal of oil field brine into any surface drainage water
course, be it dry creek, flowing creek or river.
The Railroad Commission will grant exceptions on special
request for good and sufficient cause. The exceptions are based on
"guidelines" approved by the Commission. These guidelines authorize
the Commission to grant an exception when "there are no fresh water
sands to be affected", if "the volumesof salt waters are so small as to
present no real danger of pollution," or if "the preponderance of the
evidence would warrant granting . . . an exception by applying the 'rule
of reason' ". In application the guidelines have been held to mean it is
unreasonable for the Commission to prohibit the use of saltwater pits
if it is economically impracticable for an operator to drill and install
9Water Pollution Control in Texas, 48 Tex. L. R. 1029,
1111 (June 1970) (Tim Corssow, Project Ed.).
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an expensive injection well system or if it is impossible to find a sub-
surface water zone for salt water disposal reasonably close to the point
i
240
at which the salt water is produced. This is a ground for exception
often championed by operators who urge that exceptions should be granted
"because the cost of drilling a salt water disposal well or trucking off
the salt water would be prohibitive and would force a premature abandon-
ment of the oil well with the consequent waste of hydrocarbons." ' As
time goes on the Commission will be less and less likely to accept this
argument when the choice is water or oil, One answer to this problem
is that where there is one such well there are usually others and it may
be feasible for the operators to get together in a community-type operation.
From the time the statewide "no-pit" rule went into effect in
January 1969 until June 1970 the Railroad Commission granted nearly 2,000
exceptions. The majority, 1 ,718, were lease exceptions as opposed to field
exceptions. Of these 1,718 exceptions, 896 were for unlined pits, 543 were
242
for lined pits and 279 were for fresh water pits.
The Commission has also acted to protect fresh water strata




242Water Pollution Control in Texas, 48 Tex. L. R. 1029, 1095.
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wells. It now insists that a Commission witness be present during a plug-
ging operation and there are cases where an operator had to go back and
replug a well when he didn't wait for a Commission inspector to watch the
job.
Statewide Rule 8(D) directs producers to refrain from polluting
the waters of the Texas offshore and adjacent estuarine zones.
To summarize briefly the statutes dealing with pollution of
some of the other oil and gas producing states:
OKLAHOMA -- As discussed earlier 52 O. S. A. 296, the
"saltwater law", has been in effect since 1910. It prohibits permitting
saltwater "to flow over the surface of the land". But Oklahoma has
other statutes dealing with pollution. 5 2 O. S. A. 139, et seq. enlarged
the powers of the Corporation Commission in controlling pollution result-
ing from oil and gas operation. The Commission can by general rule
establish standards for the use of surface pits and plugging wells. 29
O. S, A. 409 is a criminal statute providing:
No person, firm or corporation shall deposit, place,
throw, or permit to be deposited, placed or thrown, any
lime, dynamite, or other explosives, poison, drug, saw-
dust, salt water, crude oil or other deleterious substance,
in any of the streams, lakes or ponds of this state or in
any place where the same will run or be washed into said
streams, lakes or ponds. . .
243
Texa s Cracks Down on Brine Pollution, THE OIL AND
GAS JOURNAL, August 2, 1965 at 80.
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Where oil and gas operators are involved a complaint is filed with the
Corporation Commission and the Commission immediately notifies the
operator to remedy the pollution. If this is not done then a criminal in-
244
dictment is filed. 52 O. S. A. 309 et seq. gives the Commission
power to authorize an affected party to go upon any lands where there is
an abandoned well believed to be improperly plugged. It purports to
exonerate the party remedying such a situation from tort liability result-
ing from his attempts to properly plug the old well. The need for this
statute arose when water flood projects increased pressure in some
areas to a level where some older wells began to leak even though prop-
erly plugged under the rules in effect when abandoned.
LOUISIANA -- La, R. S. 38:216 prohibits the draining of salt
water, oil or other noxious or poisonous gases or substances into any
natural stream or drain from which water is taken for irrigation purposes
which would render the water unfit for such purposes except during an
open season between October 1 and December 31 of each year. La. R. S.
56: 1451 is similar but applies to natural streams, not just those used
for irrigation, and prohibits the drainage in quantities sufficient to
destroy the fish therein. La. R. S. 56: 1431-1445 established a Stream
Control Commission with authority to control waste disposal by any
244
Fell and Wolfe v. Oklahoma^ P. 2d27 7 , 2 E R H72(Okla. Ct.
of Crim. App. 1971).
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person into the waters of the state for the prevention of pollution of such
waters tending to destroy fish life or to be injurious to the public health,
the public welfare or to other aquatic life or wild of domestic animals or
fowls. La. RoS. 14:58 defines the crime of contaminating water supplies
as being the intentional performance of any act tending to contaminate
any private or public water supply and establishes two scales of fines
and imprisonment based on whether the act foreseeably endangers the
life or health of human beings,
CALIFORNIA -•> Water pollution control is the function of a
State Water Resources Control Board and nine regional boards. Calif,
Water Code § ISOOOff. Open pit disposal of saltwater is still allowed
in California, provided that no fresh water bearing formations are with-
in the likely drainage of the pit. Calif. Fish &: Game Code § 5 650 prohi-
bits water pollution and expressly prohibits depositing or permitting to
pass into the waters of the state any petroleum or petroleum product. A
defendant complying with the State Water Quality Control Board can still
245be held criminally liable for violation of this pollution law.
Most of the oil producing states now have statutes which attempt to
regulate pollutionfrom oil and gas operations. All states now have the water
quality standards required by Federal Water Pollution Control Act, infra.




In considering state regulation of pollution a few points need
to be kept in mind. First, that the lsgialature has provided punishment
by fine and imprisonment for pollution does not affect the power of the
state to seek an injunction when the provisions of the law are inadequate
to effect the purpose intended nor is a conviction or criminal charge a
prerequisite to issuance of injunction. A court is not deprived of juris-
diction to enjoin a public nuisance merely because it is an injury of the
property or civil rights of the public at large. Pollution is a public
246
nuisance and is lodged in the courts, independent of any statute. Second,
in at least one state the question is open as to whether a firm or corpora-
tion can be indicted or tried under the criminal laws. And third, to
hold a superintendent of a corporation liable individually there must be
248
shown a connection between him and the negligence. Thus it would seem
that a state's most effective means to regulate pollution by a corporation
would be an injunction.
B. Federal
As mentioned before, Congress has not closed its eyes to the
246Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d 5 34 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942, writ ref'd) (Approved in Ex Parte Genocov, 143 Tex. 476, 186
S.W. 2d 225, 160 ALR 1099).
Judge Lynch International Book & Publishing Co. v. State,
84 Tex. Crim. App. 459, 208 S.W. 526 (1919).
24





pollution problem and by enacting the Water Quality Act of 1965 de-
clared its purpose to be , . , "to enhance the quality and value of our
water resources and to establish a national policy for the prevention,
control and abatement of water pollution." Prior to that time the parti-
cipation of the Federal Government in water pollution control was large-
ly limited to encouraging the states. The Act created the Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration within the Department of Health, Educa-
250
tion and Welfare with responsibility for coordinating and developing
a Federal program of water pollution abatement. However, one of the act's
chief purposes was still to encourage the individual states to act. The
states had until October 2, 1966, to file a letter of intent with the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare that such state would, before June 30,
1967, adopt (a) water quality criteria applicable to interstate waters
and (b) a plan for the implementation and enforcement of the water quality
criteria adopted. If the states failed to act, the Secretary could prescribe
25 1
regulations but all fifty states did enact the necessary legislation,
24979 Stat. 903 (1965), 33 U. S. C. § 466 (Supp. 1965).
5
°Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1966 (H. Doc. 388, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess.) effective May 10, 1966 transferred the F W P C A to the De-
partment of the Interior.
25 1
Kansas was the last state to have its standards approved.
4 Tex. Pollution Report No. 11 (May 7, 1969).
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Enforcement of the water quality criteria is principally a
state matter but the Act makes it unlawful to discharge any matter into
interstate water which will reduce its quality below the standards estab-
lished under the Act. Such pollution is subject to judicial abatement
after a 180-day notice to the pollutor by the Administrator of the En-
251a
vironmental Protection Agency. If the area where the health or wel-
fare of people is endangered by the pollution is entirely within the state
where the pollution occurs, suit can be brought only with the written
consent of the governor of the state. If more than one state is involved,
the Administrator may proceed to file suit in the Federal District
Court. The Court is to give due consideration to the practicability
and to the physical and economic feasibility of complying with the ap-
plicable water quality standards and the Court is required to enter judg-
ment as the public interest and equities of the case require.
Another enforcement tool was established in 1970. As a pre-
requisite for any federal license or permit for any activity which may
25la 33 USCA 1160(b), (c)(1), (c)(5). Reorganization Plan No. 3
of 1970 (July 9, 1970 eff. Dec. 2, 1970, 35 F.R. 15623, 84 Stat. ) estab-
lished the Environmental Protection Agency and transferred from the
Department of Interior and HEW as well as other agencies most of their
environmental responsibilities. Sec. 2(a)(1) expressly transfers Interior's
functions under the Federal "Water Pollution Control Act as amended.
25lb 33 USCA 1160(c)(5).

99
result in any discharge into the navigable waters of the United States the
applicant must obtain certification from the appropriate water quality-
control agency that there is reasonable assurance the applicable water
25 lc
quality standards will not be violated.
In 1970 Congress enacted the Water Quality Improvement Act
252
of 1970. In addition to amending the existing law in some minor ways,
25 2a
Section 11(b)(1) states:
The Congress hereby declares that there should be
no discharges of oil into or upon the navigable waters of
the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon
the waters of the contiguous zone.
The act then goes on to give those who discharge oil upon such waters
the burden of proof that they are not at fault. Unless they can prove
that the "discharge was caused solely by (A) an act of God, (B) an act
of war, (C) negligence on the part of the United States Government, or
(D) an act or omission of a third party without regard to whether any
such act or omission was or was not negligent, or any combination of
the foregoing clauses,'' they must reimburse the Federal Government
25 1c 33 USCA 117 1(b). If the nevigable water is not interstate
there may be no applicable standards since the requirement for criteria
applies only to interstate waters. However, proposed regulations would
require state certification if the state has established standards.
^ 52






for its costs in cleaning up the mess they have caused. The limits of
liability are the lesser of $100 per gross ton or $14,000,000 for a vessel
and $8,000,000 for a facility either onshore or offshore. However, if the
government can show the "discharge was the result of willful negligence
or willful misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner, such
owner or operator shall be liable to the United States Government for the
full amount of such costs. Persons responsible for discharging oil
upon offshore waters have a duty to give prompt notice to federal authori-
25 3
ties. If they fail to do so, they are subject to civil or criminal penalties.
There are also provisions for the establishment of a National Contingency
25 3a
Plan for removal or discharged oil.
A much older act recently given new life by the courts is the
254
River and Harbors Act of 1899- Section 1 3 of this Act makes it a
misdemeanor to "throw, discharge, or deposit any refuse matter of any
kind or description whatever . . . into a navigable body of water in the
254a ^55
United States. 1 ' In United States v. Standard Oil Co., the defendant
252b 33 USC 1161(f). 253 33USC 1 161(b)(4)-(5).
253a 33 usc 1161 ( c)
254
30 Stat. 1152 (1899), 33 USC § 407 (1964).
254a
It can be seen that there is some overlap between Section
1 3 of the River and Harbors Act of 1899 (sometimes referred to as the
Refuse Act of 1899) and 33 USC 1 161. Keener, Federal Water Pollution
Legislation and Regulations with Particular Reference to the Oil Industry,
4 NAT. RES. LAWYER 484 at 498( 197 1) contends that the Refuse Act was
repealed in so far as oil is concerned by 33 USC 1161. "Since the juris-
dictional limits of the two statutes are different, the amounts of oil which

100 a
was indicted for accidentally discharging 100 octane gasoline into the
St. Johns River in violation of Section 13. The district court dismissed
the indictment, agreeing with the defendant that ''refuse matter" did not
include a commercially valuable product. In an opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas, the Supreme Court reversed, saying "There is nothing more
256
deserving of the label 'refuse' than oil spilled into a river." All
indications are that the Supreme Court will take a broad view of the law
in pollution cases under this or other statutes.
(cont.) would constitute an offense are different, and the penalties are
different, it would seem illogical to conclude that Congress intended
that both continue to be applicable." It seems better, however, to
assume both are still in effect. The Water Quality Improvement Act
expressly repealed the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 (33 USC 433). It did
not do so to the Refuse Act.
255
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 244, 16 L. Ed.
2d 492, 86 S. Ct. 1427 (1966).
256 384 U.S. at 229-230.

VII. INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
In recent years the overall performance of the oil and gas
industry has been exemplary. Most of the industry has realized that
it is in its best interest to get its own house in order before some
government agency forces it to do so. In 1968 the industry spent ap-
proximately$ 222.8 million on water conservation and pollution preven-
257
tion. In 1970 the oil industry was spending at the rate of $1,5 million
258
daily for pollution control equipment and environmental research.
The expenditure continues to go up each year. In 1969 the American
Petroleum Institute alone spent $600,000 on research and development
259
projects for pollution control.
As early as 1942 producers in the giant East Texas Field
organized the East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company for the sole
purpose of disposing of the salt water produced from the Field. Since
257CROSSLEY, S-D SURVEYS, INC., REPORT ON AIR AND
WATER CONSERVATION EXPENDITURES OF THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1968).
7 c o
Statement by the President of the American Petroleum
Inst., Mr.Frank N» Ikard to their annual meeting on 17 Nov. 1970 as
reported in 1 Environment Reporter, Current Developments at 752.
259




then the ETSWDC has disposed of over three billion barrels of salt
water. Today almost 100 per cent of the salt water being produced
from the Field is being reinjected into the Woodbine Formation. This
260
represents approximately 350,000 barrels of salt water a day.
An area covered by the Salt Flat,Darst Creek and Luling
Oil Fields, twenty years ago was a wasteland. But today after the ex-
penditure of several million dollars to reinject as much as 400,000
barrels of salt water a day plus proper housekeeping, including bull-
dozing slush pits, and covering up open ditches and salt water pits, the
countryside blooms again. The properties were fenced and modern
homes built. Expensive cattle now graze over what was almost worth-
less oarren land.
A survey of pollution-agency personnel conducted by the Oil
and Gas Journal found that they generally felt the states have had sur-
prisingly good cooperation from most operators in the overall effort at
? 62
pollution abatement. "While there are occasional instances of human
failures, acts of God, or accidents, in recent years the industry's record
has been good and is getting better.
260
Edwards, A Practitioner Looks at Pollution, 18 INST,







In the future we anticipate the legal consequences of pollution
to be affected by a number of factors, chief of which is the fact that the
public, administrative officials, legislatures and Congress will hold the
oil and gas industry, along with industry in general to a higher duty in
preventing pollution. Juries will be more likely to convict or assess
damages for pollution and the appellate courts will not dig too deeply
into the legal theories supporting convictions, damage awards, or
injunctions.
In general the industry can look forward to continued expendi-
tures for research and preventive measures to fulfill its social and
legal duties. The public interest will continue to emerge as a dominant
interest and absolute ownership will yield to it in many ways. Less and
less of what a person does with his land will be considered solely his
own business because of the far reaching effects that pollution has on
us all. The industry will continue to feel that it is generally better to
adjust to pressures than to wait until law forces it to do so.
Research will be increasingly directed into using waste pro-
ducts instead of just disposing of them in a non-polluting manner. Dr.
John Manning, a consultant for the Valley Waste Disposal Company
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which operates in the San Joaquin Valley of California, has done some
research in the use of waste water by plants and trees. At the Valley
Waste Disposal Company Race Track/Edison Disposal Facilities waste
water containing approximately 4,000»5,000 mg/1 of salt, and varying
amounts of boron and fluoride is disposed of by a combination of ponding,
evaporation and transpiration. The Facility is designed for approximately
20,000 barrels per day and is currently handling approximately 12,000-
13,000 barrels per day. An irrigation system is gravity fed from ponds
located higher on the hillside and water is utilized by a variety of salt
resistent plants which transpire the water. Good results have been
obtained with trees such as the tamarisk and salt cedar and with grasses
including wild rye, tall wheat and certain types of bermuda. These plant-
ings provide satisfactory forage for domestic animals including horses,
cattle, and sheep, as well as a forage and cover locality for quail and
other wild life. Valley "Waste Disposal is now considering a second such
installation.
The predecessors of the first oil wells were drilled to find
salt water and oil was considered a useless pollutor, This brine was then
evaporated for its salt content. It is possible that salt water will again
be processed for its mineral content. It is estimated that dissolved in
263
Information obtained in conversation with Dr. Manning.
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the salt water produced from oil field operations are 105 million tons
of various salt compounds such as sodium chloride, sodium sulfate,
sodium bicarbonate, sodium bromide, sodium iodide and similar salts
of lithium, potassium, calcium, magnesium, strontium, barium, boron,
iron, manganese and other elements. Oil field brines are very similar
to sea water but they often contain higher concentrations of dissolved
solids. Several companies already extract minerals from sea water.
Dow Chemical extracts magnesium and bromine, W. R. Grace extracts
magnesium and calcium, Merck extracts magnesium and other compounds,
Kaiser Refractories extracts magnesium, and Leslie Salt recovers sodium
chloride. Some American companies already recover minerals from sub-
surface brines, Dow Chemical extracts iodine, bromine, calcium, potas-
sium, and other minerals and Michigan Corp. recovers bromine, while
iodine is recovered from subsurface brines in Japan, Indonesia, Java,
France,England, Germany, and the U.S.S.R. It may be that it would not
be economical to produce the brines solely for their mineral content;
however, from the viewpoint of the petroleum industry, the real test is




Collins, Here's How Producers Can Turn Brine Disposal
Into Profit,. THE OIL & GAS JOURNAL, July 4, 1966 at 112.
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In refineries, as already mentioned, the trend is toward
chemical processes to recover useful products from waste water.
Chevron Research Co., for example, has developed a waste water
treating system which recovers almost pure ammonia and hydrogen
sulfide from flow-water streams, converting these pollutants into
salable products. Since this system went on steam in Standard Oil
Co. of California's Richmond, California refinery in April 1966, the
company has calculated a 25 per cent per year return on its invest-
merit but if the alternative disposal costs of stripping and incinerating
265
are considered the return becomes 75 per cent per year. Thus
with enough research pollution control may be able to pay its own way
and even turn a profit.
265 Chevron Turns Waste Water Into Profit , THE OIL & GAS
JOURNAL, April 1, 1968 at 79.

IX. SUMMARY
The oil and gas industry has in general responded well to
the need to get its house in order and prevent pollution from its wide
ranging activities. It has some ghosts in its past which come back to
haunt it in this day of concern for the environment but it must be rememb-
ered that most of these bad practices at the time were considered socially
acceptable and in many instances legally permissible. Only recently has
the burden of a greatly increased population driven home to us the fact
that we do not have an infinite supply of fresh water. The industry must
continue to so respond or face even stricter state and federal control.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allison and Mann, The Trial of a Water Pollution Case, 13 BAYLOR
L. REV. 199 (1961).
Bird, Our Dying Wate rs, The Saturday Evening Post, April 2 3, 1966,
at 30.
Butler, The Oil and Gas Industry and W ater Conservation, 16th OIL &
GAS INST. 301 (1965). : '.
Chevron Turns Waste Water Into Profit, THE OIL & GAS JOURNAL,
April 1, 1968 at 79c
Collins, Here's How Producers Can Turn Brine Disposal Into Profit,
THE OIL & GAS JOURNAL, July 4, 1966 at 1 117"
CROSSLEY, S~D SURVEYS, INC., REPORT ON AIR AND WATER
CONSERVATION EXPENDITURES OF THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES (1968).
Davis, C, Liability of Mineral Operators for Disturbances of Water
Sources , 12 ROCKY MT. MIN. LAW INST. 1 (1967")"]
Davis, L,, Selected Problems R e garding Lessee's Rights and Obliga-
tions to the Surface Owner , 8 ROCKY MT*. MIN. LAW~~
INST. 315 (1963).
Degler, OIL POLLUTION : PROBLEMS AND POLICIES (1969).
Dolson, H., THE GREAT OILDORADO (1959).
Edwards, A Practitioner Looks at Pollution , 18 INST. ON OIL & GAS
LAW 4 33 (1967).
Enright, Oil Field Pollution and What's Being Done About It, THE OIL
AND GAS JOURNAL, June 24, 1963 at 76.

109
Ewing, Refinery Waste Products Pose Pollution Problem, THE OIL &c
GAS JOURNAL, December 9, 1968 at if.
Green, Hazardous Oil and Gas Operations : Tort Liability, 33 TEX. L.
REV. 574 (19557!
Hampton, Environmental Control Problems and The Oil Industry in the
Rocky"Mountain R egion, 15 ROCKY MT. MIN: LAW INST?"
621 (1969).
Hooper, Public Law Remedies for Water Pollution, PROCEEDINGS,
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS WATER LAW CONFERENCE (1966).
INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, WATER PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH OIL PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED
STATES (1965).
Jones, Escape of Deleterious Sxibstances : Strict Liability vs. Liability
Based Upo'n Fault, 1 ROCKY MT. MIN. LAW INST. 163 (1955).
Keener, Federal "W ater Pollution Legislation and Regulation with Parti-
cular Reference to the Oil Industr y, 4 NAT. RES. LAWYER
484 (1971).
Keeton and Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35
TEXAS £7 REV. 1 (1956) and 39 TEXAS L. REV. 25 3 (1961).
Knodell, Liability for Pollution of Surface and Underground Waters,
12 ROCKY MT. MIN.~LAW INST. 55 (1967).
McCleskey and Phillips, Private Law Remedies for Water Pollution,
PROCEEDINGS, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS WATER LAW
CONFERENCE 88 (1966).
McConal, Pollution, The Trinity Is Like a Commode , Fort Worth Star
Telegram, July 13, 1969, § A, at 1, Col75\
McGinnis, R. Liability of Mineral Producers for Surface and Subsurface
Pollution, July 7, 1967 (Paper presented to Mineral Law
Section, State Bar of Texas).
Measure, Elements and Amount of Damages, 56 Am. Jur. 841, Waters
par. 422.




Neil, Ecology : A Sampling of Navy's Efforts and Accomplishments,
ALL HANDS, February 1971 at 25.
Pollution, 9 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts 49L
Pollution : Growing Menace - What U. S. Is Doing About It, U. S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, June 9, 1969 at 40.
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
Raschke, Smith and Wills, Let Engineering Know-how Solve Salt -
Pollution Problems , THE OIL & GAS JOURNAL, August 9,
1965 at 75.
Scott, Pollution '70: Challenge, Crisis, Change, PETROLEUM
ENGINEER, October 1970 at 39.
Scott, Oil and Gas Lease Clauses Relating to Surface Damage and Use
of the Surface , 13 ROCKY MT. MIN. LAW INST. 317 (1967).
Sellers, How Dominant Is the Dominant Estate? or, Surface Damages
Revisite d, 13th OIL AND GAS INST. 377 (1962).
Stone, Legal Aspects of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations, 8 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 478 (1968).
Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L, REV. 155 (1968),
Texas Cracks Down on Brine Pollution, THE OIL & GAS JOURNAL,
August 2, 1965 at 80.
Wallace, The Legal Consequences of Salt Water Pol lution From Oil and
Gas Operations, INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION
COMMITTEE BULLETIN, June 1966 at 20.
Water Pollution Control in Texas, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 1029, 1111 (June
1970) (Jim Carsson Project Ed. ).
WEST, W., CONSERVING OUR WATERS (19 ) (Published by Com-
mittee on Public Affairs of the American Petroleum Inst.).

Ill
The World -~ And How We Abuse It, 138 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC
78Z and Special Map ~ and - Painting Supplement (Dec. 1970).
Young, Pollution, Threat to Man's Only Home, 138 NATIONAL GEO-
GRAPHIC 7 38 (Dec. 1970).

TABLE OF CASES
Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 2 30 U. S. 46, 57 L. EcL 1384 , 3 3
S. Ct. 1004 (1913).
Bean v. Tennessee Gas Transmis sion, 136 So, 2d 315 (La. App. 1962),
Beck v. American Rio Grande Land &: Irrigation Co., 39 S. W. 2d S, W.
640 (Tex. Ci". App. 1931 writ refused).
Beck v. Bel Air Properties, 134 Cal. App. 2d 834, 286 P, 2d 503 (1955).
Benjamin v. Gulf, C. &t S.F. Ry. , 49 Tex. Civ. App. 47 3, 108 S. W. 408
(1908, writ ref'd ).
Bigham Bros, v. Port Arthur Canal & Dock Co.
,
100 Tex. 192 ,97
S. W. 686 (1906).
Breaux v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 131 So, 2d 615 (La. App. 1961),
Brown v. Lundell, 344 S. W. 2d 863, 14 O & GR 611 (Tex. 1961).
Burns v. Lamb , 312 S. W, 2d 7 30, 8 O & GR 1262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958.
Error ref'd n. r. e„).
Callihan Interest, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S. W. 2d 586 (Tex. Civ, App.
1964, error ref'd).
Champlin Refining Co, v. Rayburn, 323 P. 2d 967, 8 O & GR 1082
(Okla, 1958).
Cities Service Gas Co. v. Eggers, 186 Okla, 466, 98 P. 2d 1114, 126
ALR 1278 (1940).
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, 3 32 P. 2d 677, 9 O& GR 1136
(Okla. 1958),
Continental Oil Co. v. City of Groesbeck, 95 S, W. 2d 714 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936 writ dis.).

113
Continental Oil Co. v. Williams , 207 Okla. 501 , 250 P. 2d 4 39,
2 O & GR 77 (1952).
Cosden Oil Co, v. Sides, 35 S. W. 2d 8 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931, writ
ref'd).
Crawford v» Magnolia Petroleum Co., 62 S. W. 2d 264 (Tex, Civ. App.
19 33, no writ history).
Crawford v. Yeatts, 395 S.W.2d 413, 24O fa GR 65 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965, error ref'd n. r. e,).
Curry v. Ingram, 397 S, W. 2d 484, 23 Ofa GR 976 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965, error ref'd n. r. e.).
Danciger Oil fa Ref. Co. v. Donahey , 205 Okla, 390, 2 38 P. 2d 308,
1 O fa GR 100 (1951).
Darby Petroleum Corporation v. Mason, 176 Okla. 138, 54 P. 2d 1046
Deep Rock Oil Corp. v. Micco, 262 P. 2d 45 1, 3 O & GR 187 (Okla.
1953).
Delhi- Taylor Oil Corporation v, Holmes, 344 S. W. 2d 420, 14 O fa
GR 103 (Texas 1961).
Devonian Oil Co. v. Smith, 124 Okla. 71, 254 P. 14 (1926).
Donahue v. Stockton Gas fa E. Co., 6 Cal„ App, 276, 92 P. 196 (1907).
D ubois v. Phillips Petroleum Lo„ 221 La. 161, 59 So. 2d 107 (1952).
Duhon, v. Buckley , 161 So. 2d 301, ^0 O fa GR 330 (La. App. 1964).
Eagen v. Tri-State Oil Co
., 185 So, 124 (La. App. 1938).
East Texas Oil R. Co. v. Mabee Consolidated Corp., 10 3 S. W. 2d 795
Tex. Civ. App. 1937, writ ctismi c ceu 127 S. W. 2d 445).
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S. W. 2d 558 (1948).

114
Ellis Drilling Corporation v. McGuire, 32 1 S. W. 2d 91 1, 10 O & GR
817 (Tex. Civ. App, 1959, error ref'd n.r.e.).
Ex parte Genecov, 14 3 Tex. 476, 186 S.W.2d 225, 160 ALR 1099 (1945),
Fell and Wolfe v. Oklahoma, 48 P.2d 277, 2 Environment Reporter 1172
(Okla. Ct. of Cr.im. App. 197 1).
Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co, , 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845, 4 O & GR
1499 (1955).
Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jackson, 202 Okla. 687, 217 P. 2d 816, 19 ALR
2d 1015 (1950).
General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W.2d 668, 14 O & GR 631 (Tex.1961).
Geochemical Surveys v. Dietz, 340 S.W.2d 114, 14 O & GR 409 (Tex. Civ.
App, I960, error ref'd n.r.e.).
Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d 5 34 (Tex.Civ.App. 1942, writ
ref'd) (Approved in Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 186 S.W.
2d 225, 160 ALR 1099)^
Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P.952, 60 ALR 475
(1928).
Greer v. Pelican Natur al Gas Co., Inc. , 163 So. 431 (La. App. 1935),
Gregg v. Delhi- Taylor Oil Corp. , 344 S.W. 2d 411, 14 O h GR 106 (Tex.
1961).
Griffith Company v. San Diego College for Women, 280 P. 2d 20 3 (Cal.
Appa 1955).
~
Gulf, C.& S.F.Co. v. Oakes , 94 Tex.155,58 S.W. 999, 52 LRA 293 (1900).
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Alexander, 295 S.W. 2d 901, 6 O h GR 1233 (Tex.
1956).
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Bob Alexander, 291 S.W. 2d 792, 6 O & GR 457
(Tex.Civ.App. 1956, error ref'd n.r.e,).
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Hughes, 371 P. 2d 81, 16 O h GR 1016 (Okla. 1962).

115
Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Aired, 182 Okla. 400, 77 P. 2d 1155 (1938).
Harper- Turner Oil Company v. Bridge, 311 P. 2d 947, 7 O h GR
L017 (Okla, 1957).
Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 149 Tex. 416 , 2 34 S.W.2d 389 (1950).
Hayncs B. Ownby Drilling Co. v. McClure, 264 S.W.2d 204, 3 O & GR
149 3 (Tex. Civ. App. 1054, error ref'd n. r. e„).
Hoyt v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 69 So, 546, 30& GR 296 (La,
App. 195 3).
Humble Pipe Line Company v. Anderson , 3 39 S.W. 2d 25 9, 13 O & GR
635 (Tex. Civ. App. i960 error ref'd n. r. e„).
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Day
,
172 S.W. 2d 3566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943,
error ref'd, want of merit).
Ingram v, City of Gridley, 100 Cal. App. 2d 815, 224 P. 2d 798 (1950).
Jackson v. Clark
,
264 P. 2d 727, 3 O & GR 198 (Okla. 1953).
Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Carnes, 174 Okla. 599, 5 1 P. 2d 811 (1935).
Jordan v. Peek, 268 P. 2d 242, 3 O & GR 332 (Okla, 1954).
Judge Lynch International Book h Publishing Co. v. State, 84 Tex.
Crim. App. 459 , ^08 S.W. 526 (1919).
Klostermann v. Houston Geophysical Company, 3 1 5 S.W. 2d 664, 9 O
& GR 546 (Tex. Civ. App, 1958, writ ref d)
.
Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 256, 248
S.W. 2d 731, lO&GR 935, 1952).
Levaroni v. Miller, 34 Cal. 2 31, 91 Am, Dec, 692, 12 Mor. Min. Rep.
232 (1867).
Lewis v. Berry &c Company, P. 2d ,2 Environment Reporter
1041 (Okla. 1970).
Loeffler v. King, 228 S.W. 2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) rev'd on other
grounds, 2 36 S.W. 2d 772 (195 1).

116
Logan v. Driscoll, 19 Cal, 623, 81 Am. Dec. 90, 6 Mor. Min. Rep.
172 (1862).
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Sanders, 249 S.W.2d 747, 1Q& GR 1176
(Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Hutton, 122 Tex. 284, 58 S.W.2d 19 (Texas Comm.
App. 19 3 3).
Lone Star Gas Company v. Thomas, 345 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App,
196 1 error ref'd n. r. e.).
Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P. 2d 1(1948).
Lynn v. Maag, 222 F.2d 703, 4 O & GR 1037 (5th Cir. Tex. 1955).
Magnolia Petroleum C o. v. State, 218 S.W. 2d 855 (Tex, Civ, App.
1949 error ref'd n.r.e.).
McFarlain v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 118 La. 5 37, 43 So. 155 (1907),
Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v. Crauthers, 267 P. 2d 568 (Okla. 1954).
Mid-Continent Pipeline Company v. Ebenwein, 333 P. 2d 561, 9 O <k GR
Middlekampt v. Bessmer Irrigating Ditch Co., 46 Colo. 102, 103 P. 280
(1909).
Monte t v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 135 So. 2d 805, 16 O & GR 5 62 (La. App.
1961).
Moran Corp. v. Murray, 38 1 S.W. 2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964, No writ
history).
Myers v. State, 148 Tex.Crim. App. 77 , 184 S.W. 2d 924 (1945).
New Odorless Sewerage Co. v. Wisdom, 70 S.W. 354 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964, error ref'd).
Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403 P.2d 507, 22 O & GR 794 (1965).

117
Owen-Osage Oil h Gas Co. v. Long, 104 Okla. 242, 231 P. 296 (1924).
Parker v. Larsen, 8 6 Cal 2 36, 24 P. 989, 21 Am. St. Rep. 30 (1890).
People v. Union Oil Co,, 268 Cal. App.2d 721, 74 Cal. Reptr. 78 (1968).
Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co., 37 S,W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) aff'd
128 Tex. 550, 98 S.W.2d 781 (1936).
Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa. 267, 44 Am. St. Rep. 660, 30 A. 844 (1895).
Pfeiffer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 207 Okla. 48, 247 P. 2d 520, 1 O &
GR 1270 (1952).
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F. 2d 205 (5th Cir. La. 1951).
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Sheel, 256 P. 2d 8 15, 2 O & GR 986 (Okla.
1953).
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. West, 284 S.W.2d 196, 5 O & GR 621 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955, error ref'd n.r.e.).
Phoenix v.Graham, 349 111. App. 326, 110 N.E,2d 669, 2 O & GR 325
(1953).
Pickens v. Harrison, 151 Tex. 562, 252 S.W.2d 575, 1 O & GR 1813
(1952).
Pickens v. Harrison, 246 S.W.2d 313, 1 O & GR 52 3 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952 modified in part).
Polzin v. National Co-op Refinery Association, 175 Kan. 5 31, 266
"
P72d 29 3,To~& GR 776 (1954).
Pure Oil Co. v. Chisholm, 18 1 Okla. 618, 75 P.2d 464 (1936).
Pure Oil Co. v. Renton, 207 Okla. 15 1 ,248 P„2d 580, 1 O & GR
1727 (1952).
Railroad Commission v. Manzicl, 361 S„ W. 2d 560, 17 O k GR 444
(Tex. 1962).
Ross v. Fink, 378 P. 2d 1011, 18 O k GR 489 (1963).

118
Rudes v. Gotts chalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201 (1959).
Scurlock Oil Co. v. Roberts, 370 S.W.2d 755, 19 O & GR 385 (Tex.
Civ. App. 196 3, no writ history).
Shapiro v. Eastman, 39 O.B.A.J. 1005, 30 O h GR 49 (Okla. 1968).
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Wilson, 178 Okla. 335, 65 P. 2d 173 (1935).
Skansi v. Humble Oil h Refining Co., 176 So. 2d 2 36, 23 O & GR 378
(La. App. 1965).
Slater v. Pacific American Oil Co. , 212 Cal. 648, 300 P. 31 (1931).
Southland Company v. Aaron, 221 Miss. 59, 72 So. 2d 161, 49 ALR 2d
243, 3 O & GR 822 (1954).
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 2 3 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Com. App. 1930).
Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 27 O & GR 797 (Texas 1968).
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, 366 P. 2d 214, 15 O & GR
504 (Okla. 1961).
Sussex Land 8r Live Stock Company v. Midwest Refining Company,
294 F. 597, 34 ALR 249 (8th Cir. TWW.
Teel v. Rio Bravo Oil Co. , 47 Tex. Civ. App. 15 3, 104 S.W. 420 (1907
No writ history).
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Fromme, 15 3 Tex. 352 f
_________
Texas Co. v. Belvin, 207 Okla„ 549, 251 P. 2d 804, 2 O & GR 94 (1952).
Texas Co, v. Earles, 164 S.W. 28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914 no writ history).
Texas Co. v. Giddings, 148 S.W. 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912, no writ history),
Texas Co. v. Mosshamer, 175 Okla. 202, 51 P. 2d 757 (1935).

119
Texas & P. Ry. Co, v. O'Mahoney, 60 S.W. 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900
writ ref'd).
Tidewater Oil Company v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157, 18 O & GR 982
(10th Cir. 1963) cert, denied 375 U. S. 942 (1963).
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 108 S.W. 2d 424 (1946).
Triangle Motors of Dallas v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354, 258 S.W. 2d
60 (1958).
Turnbow v. Lamb, 95 F.2d 29 (5th Cir, 1958).
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Company, 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W. 2d 211 (1936),
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U. S. 224, 16 L. Ed. 2d 492,
86 S. Ct. 1427 (1966).
Vodopija v. Gulf Refining Co. , 198 F. 2d 344, 1 O & GR 1210 (5th Cir.
La. 1952).
Walters v. Prairie Oil &c Gas Co., 85 Okla. 77, 204 Pac. 906 (1922).
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 15 3 Tex. 475, 27 1 S.W, 2d 410,
3 O & GR 1565 (1954).
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S. W, 2d
362, 7 O & GR 1108 (1957) reversing 299 S.W. 2d 398 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957).
Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So. 2d 27 3 (1944),
Wendtlandt v. Nationa l Co-operative Refinery Ass'n. , 168 Kan. 619,
_________ _ .
West Edmond Hutton Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P. 2d 730, 3 O & GR
1426 (Okla. 1954).
West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9,
226 P. 2d 965 (1950).
White v. Edgerly Petroleum Company, 4 La. App. 20 (1925).

120
Williams v. Pelican Natural Gas Co., 187 La. 462, 175 So, 23 (1937).
Windfohr v, Johnson's Estate, 57 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ, App. 1932, no
writ history).
"Wixon v. The Be ar River and Auburn Water and Mining Company,
24 Cal. 367, 85 Am. Dec. 69, 1 Mor. Min. Rep. 656 (1864) .
Wohlford v. American Gas Production Company, 218 F.2d 213, 4 O &
GR 448 (5th Cir. Texas 1955).
Wright v. Best , 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P. 2d 702 (1942).













fiff ?>nH wpter; the




3 2768 001 98064 2
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
